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ARTICLES

INTERPRETING UN SANCTIONS:
THE RULINGS AND ROLE OF THE
YUGOSLAVIA SANCTIONS COMMITTEE
Michael P. Scharf
JoshuaL. Dorosin **
In response to the evolving crisis in Yugoslavia, 1 the United Nations Security Council adopted several resolutions imposing first an arms embargo on the territory of the former Yugoslavia and later sweeping economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) (FRY), which
was viewed as primarily responsible for the continuing hostilities.2 As in the five other sanctions regimes imposed by UN
* Assistant Professor of Law, New England School of Law; A-B. Duke University, J.D. Duke University School of Law; Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal
Adviser, U.S. Department of State, 1989-1993. From 1991-1993, Mr. Scharf served
as the U.S. Department of State lawyer with responsibility for the drafting and
interpretation of UN Security Council Resolutions concerning the Yugoslavia crisis.
The author benefitted from feedback to a preliminary version of this article at a
New England School of Law "works in progress" session.
** A.B. Colgate University, M.Sc. London School of Economics, J.D. Candidate
University of Michigan Law School. In 1993, Mr. Dorosin was an extern in the
Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, where he served as a member of the State Department's Serbia Sanctions Task Force.
1. For a detailed discussion of the events leading up to the imposition of
sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) (FRY),
see J. Zuckerman, The InternationalResponse to the Dissolution of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1992).
2. The sanctions were imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and thus were binding on UN Member States. See U.N. CHARTER art.
25 & 49.
Through Resolution 713 (September 25, 1991), the Security Council imposed
an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. Resolution 727 (January 8, 1992) extended the
embargo to all the States which were formerly part of Yugoslavia. S.C. Res. 713,
U.N. SCOR, 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/713 (1991) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 713].
Resolution 727 (January 8, 1992) extended the embargo to all the states which
were formerly part of Yugoslavia. S.C. Res. 727, U.N. SCOR, 3028th mtg. S6, U.N.
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Security Council resolutions (against South Africa, Iraq, Soma-

lia, Libya, and Haiti), enforcement of the Yugoslavia sanctions
was left to individual states.' Thus, the legal interpretation of
the meaning of the sanctions provisions-and consequently the
way in which the sanctions would be implemented-was in the

first instance left to individual states. Inevitably, questions
about the meaning of the provisions arose, both as states
themselves grappled with often arcane and ambiguous language and as disputes ensued between states interpreting the
language of the sanctions resolutions differently.
Questions concerning the interpretation of the sanctions
resolutions are brought before the UN Sanctions Committee, a
quasi-judicial body created by the Security Council to facilitate
the implementation of the sanctions. 4 The Sanctions Committee issues interpretations of the sanctions resolutions on a
case-by-case basis in the form of UN press releases or communications from the Chairman of the Committee to the particu-

Doc. S/Res/727 (1992) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 727]. Resolution 743 (February 21,
1992) created an exception to the arms embargo for the UN peacekeeping forces.
S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 3055th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res1743 (1992) [hereinafter
S.C. Res. 743].
Resolution 757 (May 30, 1992) imposed a variety of economic sanctions on
the FRY. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 3082d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/757 (1992) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 757]. These sanctions were later modified, expanded, and clarified
through the adoption of Security Council Resolutions 760 (June 18, 1992), 787
(November 16, 1992), and 820 (April 17, 1993). S.C. Res. 760, U.N. SCOR, 3086th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/760 (1992) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 760]; S.C. Res. 787, U.N.
SCOR, 3137th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/787 (1992) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 787]; S.C.
Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 3200th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/820 (1993) [hereinafter S.C.
Res. 820].
3. The United States implemented the sanctions through the promulgation of
several Executive Orders under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1977), and the United Nations Participation
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1988). See Exec. Order No. 12908, 57 Fed. Reg. 23299
(1992); Exec. Order No. 12810, 57 Fed. Reg. 24347 (1992); Exec. Order No. 12831,
58 Fed. Reg. 5253 (1993); and Exec. Order No. 12846, 58 Fed. Reg. 25771 (1993).
The first three of these Executive Orders were incorporated into a comprehensive
set of regulations issued by the Department of Treasury. See 31 C.F.R. Pt. 858
(1993).
4. There is a separate UN Sanctions Committee for each of the sanctions
regimes. The focus of this article is the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee, which
has been by far the most active of any of the Sanctions Committees in issuing
interpretations- of the sanctions resolutions. The Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee
was established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 724 (1991) and is formally
titled The Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724
(1991) Concerning Yugoslavia. S.C. Res. 724, U.N. SCOR 3023d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/Res/724 (1991).
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lar states involved. These communications, much like opinions
of the UN Legal Counsel, serve as the authoritative pronouncement of the United Nations on the questions involved. Although the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee has already issued over 2,000 communications interpreting the Yugoslavia
sanctions,5 its operation has until now received scant public
attention.6
Part I of this article provides, for the first time, a systematic analysis of over one hundred key rulings of the UN Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee, grouping them into categories for
easy reference. 7 It is hoped that this digest of important Sanctions Committee rulings will aid the members of the Sanctions
Committee in identifying and following precedent, aid governments in implementing the sanctions, and assist businesses
(and their lawyers) in operating under them.' This Article
does not, however, purport to be a comprehensive survey of all
of the Sanctions Committee's cases, or even all of its important
cases. Indeed, one of the main purposes of this piece is to demonstrate the need for such a comprehensive undertaking by the
UN Secretariat. Rather, this Article focuses on those Sanctions
Committee cases that establish important precedent, significantly expand or contract the reach of the sanctions, or tell us
something useful about the nature and operation of the Sanctions Committee. Drawing from this material, Part II of the
Article seeks to provide broader insights into the process of UN
Security Council resolution implementation and suggests sev-

5. Interview with Frederick Baron, member of the U.S. State Department
Serbia Sanctions Task Force, in Washington D.C. (June 21, 1993) [hereinafter
Interview with Frederick Baron].
6. Sanctions Committee communications are designated "restricted" for routing purposes, meaning that they are distributed to governments and missions, but
not to UN depository libraries. The U.S. Government does not treat UN "restricted" documents as "classified material." Telephone Interview with Flora Evon, Director of U.S. Department of State International Organizations Documents Center
(Oct. 1, 1993).
7. The analysis draws upon the Sanctions Committee's formal communications as well as the record of its proceedings.
8. This material sh 9 uld continue to remain of use even after the sanctions on
the FRY are lifted, since the rulings of the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee will
guide the work of other existing UN Sanctions Committees and future committees
in interpreting similarly worded provisions of Security Council sanctions resolutions. See generally infra part lI.B.
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eral possible changes to improve the way in which the Sanctions Committee operates.
I. THE RULINGS OF THE SANCTIONS COMMITTEE
The Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee was originally established by Security Council Resolution 724 to recommend appropriate measures to the Security Council in response to violations of the arms embargo.9 The Committee's mandate was
later expanded by Security Council Resolutions 757 and 760,
which authorized the Sanctions Committee to recommend
appropriate measures to the Council in response to violations
of the economic sanctions, to promulgate guidelines for sanctions implementation, and (under a no-objection procedure) to
decide upon applications for the approval of humanitarian
shipments.10 Although the Security Council has never expressly given the Sanctions Committee a general mandate to
issue interpretations of the sanctions resolutions, as will be
seen below, the Committee has taken on this function in responding to communications received from states seeking clarification of the sanctions resolutions' reach.
The Sanctions Committee is composed of representatives
of the fifteen states that are members of the Security Council." While unanimous decision of the Committee is technically required only for those questions that are governed by the
Committee's "no-objection" procedure (such as approval of
humanitarian shipments into the FRY), in practice the Committee makes all of its decisions by consensus. Cases come
before the Committee through communications by states seeking the Committee's views on, or its authorization for, proposed
action.' In the United States, the State Department will

9. S.C. Res. 724, U.N. SCOR 3023d mtg. T 5(b), U.N. Doc. S/Res/724 (1991).
10. S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2; S.C. Res. 760, supra note 2.
11. The ten non-permanent members of the Security Council in 1992 were
Cape Verde, India, Japan, Morocco, Zimbabwe, Hungary, Ecuador, Venezuela, Austria, and Belgium. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States are the permanent members. See U.N. Press Release, Department of Public
Information, ORGI1155 (Jan. 4, 1993).
12. With few exceptions, the Sanctions Committee has been strict in its refusal to consider requests not emanating from governments or international organizations. See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724
(1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 10th mtg., at 12, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.27/SlR10 [hereinafter S/AC.27/SR.10] (restricted).
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transmit a request for a Sanctions Committee ruling usually in
response to an application submitted to the Department of
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control for a license to
export an otherwise prohibited item. The Sanctions
Committee's Secretariat" then circulates a draft response,
which the members of the Committee send to their capitols for
approval or comment.'4 When there is objection to the proposed communication, members of the Committee may table
substitute (or revised) drafts for circulation. Routine cases are
handled as a paper exercise. The full Committee normally
meets on a weekly basis to discuss and take action on the more
complex or controversial cases on its agenda. 5
Drawing from the record of these meetings as well as the
Sanctions Committee's formal communications, this section of
the Article analyzes the Sanctions Committee's rulings within
the context of the following five broad categories: (1) the arms
embargo; (2) restrictions on exports to the FRY; (3) restrictions
on imports from the FRY; (4) restrictions on FRY shipping; and
(5) restrictions on FRY participation in sporting events.
A

The Arms Embargo

The Security Council sanctions resolutions impose "a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and
military equipment to Yugoslavia.""6 The initial resolution
imposing the arms embargo, resolution 713, was adopted in

13. According to a recent report of the U.S. General Accounting Office, the
Sanctions Committee has a staff of only two persons, who are increasingly overwhelmed by the Committee's large and growing workload. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Report: Serbia-Montenegro: Implementation of U.N. Economic
Sanctions, at 6 (April 1993) [hereinafter GAO].
14. In the United States, an inter-agency task force (whose members include
the State Department, the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, and the National Security Council) must approve the draft communications as
well as U.S. draft substitute responses in non-routine cases. The drafting of such
responses is done by the State Departmenfs Office of International Organizations
Affairs and the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Affairs.
Interview with Frederick Baron, supra note 5.
15. Interview with Frederick Baron, supra note 5.
16. See S.C. Res. 713, supra note 2. The United States implemented the arms
embargo through an order prohibiting export of defense articles to the former
Yugoslavia, effective July 19, 1991 (the U.S. action preceded the UN embargo). See
Public Notice 1427, Suspension of Munitions Export Licenses to Yugoslavia, 56
Fed. Reg. 33,322 (1991).
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September 1991-several months before Croatia, Slovenia, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina were recognized by the international community as independent states separate from Yugoslavia.
Through indirect action that escaped the notice of most commentators as well as many governments, the Security Council
later reaffirmed that the arms embargo continued to apply to
each of the states that emerged from the territory of the former Yugoslavia.' 7
In light of armed attacks by forces under the direction of
the FRY against Bosnia-Herzegovina, the application of the
arms embargo to Bosnia became a matter of controversy. On
March 20, 1993, the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina submitted a request for provisional measures (the equivalent of a
preliminary injunction) to the International Court of Justice,18 arguing that resolution 713 and other relevant Security
Council resolutions must be construed to allow states to provide Bosnia-Herzegovina with military equipment in accordance with its inherent right of individual and collective selfdefense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 9 While the International Court of Justice declined to rule on the issue on juris-

17. S.C. Res. 727, supra note 2, T 6 (which "reaffirm[s] the embargo applied
in paragraph 6 of resolution 713 (1991) and in paragraph 5 of resolution 724
(1991), and decides that the embargo applies in accordance with paragraph 33 of
the Secretary-General's report (S/23363)."). See Further Report of the Secretary.
General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991), U.N. SCOR, at 7,
S 33, U.N. Doc. S/23363 (1992) [hereinafter S/23363]. Paragraph 33 of that report
provided: "Indeed, Mr. Vance added that the arms embargo would continue to
apply to all areas that have been part of Yugoslavia, any decisions on the question of the recognition of the independence of certain republics notwithstanding."
Id.
18. See Case Concerning Application of the Convention on Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugo. (Serbia and
Montenegro)), 1993 I.C.J. (Apr. 8), reprinted in 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 505 (1993) (concerning the request for the indication of provisional measures). The International
Court of Justice ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to consider this claim. Id. at 515.
19. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. The Charter provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international Peace and Security. Measures taken
by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Comcil and shall not in any way affect
the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order
to maintain or restore international peace and security.
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dictional grounds, the United States Department of State has
taken the position that lif the United States were to act in a
manner inconsistent with the Security Council's Chapter VII
arms embargo on Bosnia on the theory that Bosnia's right of
self-defense supersedes the actions of the Council, the authority of the Security Council would be severely undermined."2"
As indicated below, notwithstanding Bosnia's arguments concerning its right of self-defense, the Sanctions Committee has
continued to apply the arms embargo to all of the states of the
former Yugoslavia including Bosnia.
Several of the first cases brought before the Sanctions
Committee concerned "dual-use" items-that is, items that
could be used either for military or civilian purposes. The first
such case, considered by the Committee on March 16, 1992,
concerned Germany's refusal to return several Yugoslav helicopters to the FRY, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia after the
completion of routine servicing. The FRY sought assistance
from the Committee in its efforts to secure the return of one of
the aircraft, which it described as a civilian helicopter not
subject to the arms embargo.21 Germany informed the Committee that, although not armed, the helicopters had nevertheless been classified as dual-purpose aircraft under the relevant
German regulations.22 Germany felt that, since the deployment of the helicopters in connection with armed conflicts in
20. See Letter from Wendy R. Sherman, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State to Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives (undated) (enclosing an analysis by the State Department Legal Adviser of the BosniaHerzegovina Self-Defense Provision of H.R. 2333) (on file with author). The Legal

Adviser's analysis states, in part:
The right to self-defense does not necessarily entail an unrestricted right
to purchase or receive arms from the world at large. Even assuming that
an arms embargo constrains the right to self defense, however, the second sentence of Article 51 makes clear that the Security Council may
take action under Chapter VII of the Charter which may indeed affect a
State's exercise of the right of self-defense . . . . [W]hen the Security
Council imposes an arms embargo or cease-fire, such actions will often
affect a State's exercise of the right of self-defense.
Id.
21. See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724

(1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 6th mtg. at 4-6, U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/SR.6"
(1992) [hereinafter S/AC.27/SR.6 (restricted).
22. See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724
(1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 7th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/SR.7
(1992) [hereinafter S/AC.27/SR.71 (restricted).
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the former Yugoslavia could not be ruled out, it could not approve the re-export of the helicopters in view of the arms embargo unless it was authorized to do so by the Sanctions CommitteeY Although the Chairman of the Committee initially
expressed doubts regarding whether the Committee had the
competence to address the question of dual-use items, after
discussion by the Committee he ruled that the question of dual
use was germane to the Committee's work.' The Committee
then decided that the position of the German authorities in
this case was well-founded and decided not to authorize the reexport of the helicopter to the FRY.'
The March 16, 1992 ruling on the dual-use helicopter case
can be, viewed as the Marbury v. Madison26 of Yugoslavia
Sanctions Committee jurisprudence. Finding that the Security
Council resolution establishing its mandate "did not have to be
interpreted restrictively," the Committee in effect asserted its
authority to issue interpretations of the sanctions resolutions
as incidental to its mandate.27
The Committee soon had occasion to refine its position on
dual-use helicopters when it approved a request from Canada
to authorize the sale of a medi-vac helicopter to BosniaHerzegovina.' The Committee distinguished the Canadian
request, involving a specifically equipped ambulance helicopter
which would have to be dismantled before it could be converted
to military use, from the German-held police helicopters, which

23. 1&
24. See S/AC.27/SR.6, supra note 21, at 5-6.
25. See S/AC.27/SR.7, supra note 22, at 3.
26. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). In this seminal case the Supreme Court of the United
States first asserted its constitutional right to exercise judicial review on the constitutionality of U.S. legislation.
27. See SIAC.27/SR.6, supra note 21, at 4, 6. According to the record, the

Chairman of the Sanctions Committee "wondered whether the Committee had the
competence to address [questions of interpretation of the sanctions] and what capacity it had to identify materials and equipment susceptible to dual use or capable of being converted to military use." S/AC.27/SR.6, supra note 21, at 5. The

Chairman concluded from the Committee's discussion of the matter that "Resolution 724 (1991) [establishing the Committee] did not necessarily have to be interpreted restrictively. The issues raised by the case under consideration, such as the

dual

use

of

equipment

were

germane

to the

S/AC.27/SR.6, supra note 21, at 6.
28. See S/AC.27/SR.7, supra note 22, at 5-7.

Committee's

work ....
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the Committee believed were relatively easy to modify for
military use.29
In a different dual-use context, the Committee declined to
authorize a request by Germany to ship DM 24,100 worth of
nitroglycerin to be used by the FRY in mining coal to meet the
country's humanitarian electric needs, pending adequate assurances that the end use would not be military.3" Similarly, the
Committee refused to authorize a request from Hungary to
export one hundred mine-detection devices to Croatia, despite
assurances that the end-user of the devices would be the special mine-sweeping unit of the Croatian police which is not
involved in any military activity, and that the devices would be
used solely to secure the safe return of the civilian population
to the territories evacuated by the Serbian Army."'
An important factor in such cases is that the "humanitarian exception" applicable to other aspects of the sanctions does
not apply to the arms embargo. The only organization authorized to receive and use military equipment in the former Yugoslavia is UNPROFOR, the UN Peacekeeping force. Therefore, the only relevant issue in these cases is whether there
were sufficient assurances that the items would not be put to a
military use.
The resolutions imposing the arms embargo do not contain
any provisions concerning the disposition of items seized in
violation of the embargo. When Croatia reported that it seized
a cargo of military weapons unloaded from an Iranian airliner
at Zagreb airport, the Committee authorized the Croatian
authorities to destroy immediately all the military equipment
in question under the supervision of UNPROFOR.33 This is to

29. See S/AC.27/SR.7, supra note 22, at 5.
30. See Letter from the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee to the Permanent Representative of Germany to the UN (Nov. 9, 1992) (U.N. Dec.
S/AC.27/19920C.1395).
31. Sanctions Comm. Case 444/Add.1 of Sept. 10, 1992. See also Interview
with Frederick Baron, supra note 5.
32. See S.C. Res. 743, supra note 2. ("Decides within the same framework
that the embargo imposed by paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 713

(1991) shall not apply to weapons and military equipment destined for the sole
use of UNPROFOR."). See also Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the
Sanctions Committee, to "Whomever It May Concern" (June 5, 1992) (U.N. Dec.
S/AC.27/1992/OC.12).
33. See Letter from Katsumi Sezaki, Acting Chairman of Sanctions Committee,
to Jos6 Ayala Lasso, President of the Security Council (Sept. 14, 1992) (U.N. Dc.
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be contrasted with the Committee's position on embargoed
items seized outside the country upon which sanctions have
been imposed. In such cases the Committee has authorized the
seizing state to dispose of the items as it sees fit so long as "no
funds or benefits related to the [seized items] should be made
available
to entities in or operating from the [embargoed coun"
try] .

B. Exports to the FRY
The main purpose of the Security Council imposed sanctions on the FRY was to disrupt the FRY economy, and thereby "apply pressure on Serbia-Montenegro to meet UN demands
to cease outside aggression and interference in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. "' 5 The key to this was a comprehensive embargo

imposed on exports to the FRY. This was not to be a complete
embargo, however. As discussed in the following section of this
Article, the Security Council expressly created certain exceptions, which the Sanctions Committee interpreted broadly, and
the Sanctions Committee itself created a host of other exceptions to the embargo.
1. The Humanitarian Exception
The meaning and scope of the "humanitarian exception"-those provisions in the sanctions regime which carved
exceptions to restrictions on exports to the FRY for foodstuffs,
medicines, and other humanitarian items as well as financial
transactions related to such humanitarian shipments-have
been the source of continuous debate both within the United
Nations and among states seeking to implement the sanctions
regime. With the possible exception of the problems encountered in the interpretation of the provisions regarding shipping
on the high seas, in territorial waters, and on the Danube
River, the humanitarian provision has provided the Sanctions

S/AC.27/199210C.752).
34. Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724 (1991)
Concerning Yugoslavia, Proposed Amendment to Draft Letter to Colombia, U.N.
SCOR, 54th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1993/Comm.375/Amend.2. (1993) [hereinafter
Draft Letter].
35. See GAO, supra note 13, at 4.
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Committee with a greater amount of case work than any other
category of the sanctions.
When first established, the Yugoslavia sanctions regime's
humanitarian exception was limited to the supply of commodities or products intended strictly for medical purposes and
foodstuffs, which could be shipped to the FRY after the state of
origin notified the Sanctions Committee of the shipment.36
During the Sanctions Committee's meeting on June 10, 1992,
the Chairman of the Committee tabled a draft communication
stating that the exemption to the sanctions set forth in paragraph 10 of resolution 757 (for activities related to
UNPROFOR, to the Conference on Yugoslavia, and to the
European Community Monitor Mission) 7 applied as well to
the emergency relief assistance being provided by the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, the World Health Organization,
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations Development Programme, and UNICEF. 3
The United Kingdom's Sanctions Committee representative believed that the proposed interpretation was unfounded.
Instead, he took the position that a new Security Council resolution containing language similar to paragraph 20 of resolution 687 concerning Iraq was needed.39 The representatives of

36. S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, S 4c. The Security Council decides that all
states shall prevent:
[Tihe sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using
their flag vessels or aircraft of any commodities or products, whether or
not originating in their territories, but not including supplies intended
strictly for medical purposes and foodstuffs notified to the [Sanctions
Committee], to any person or body for the purpose of any business carried on, in or operated from the FRY, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote
such sale or supply of such commodities or products.
S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, S 4c.
37. See S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, S 10, in which the Security Council decided "that the measures imposed by this resolution shall not apply to activities
related to UNPROFOR, to the Conference on Yugoslavia or to the European Community Monitor Mission ....
"
38. See S/AC.27/SR.10, supra note 12, at 9-10.
39. See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724
(1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 12th mtg. at 2-4, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.27/SR.12 (1992) (restricted). Resolution 687 (1991) provided in relevant part
that the Iraq sanctions "shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the [Sanctions
Committee] or with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and
accelerated 'no objection' procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian
needs.. .." Id.
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the United States, Belgium, Austria, Japan, and France, on
the other hand, expressed the view that the Committee could
include such a provision in its guidelines without waiting for
Security Council action.' Their position on this matter gave
an early indication of the willingness of the Sanctions Committee to interpret Security Council sanctions resolutions liberally.
Ultimately, a compromise was reached whereby the Committee
decided to promulgate the proposed guideline without delay,
but also simultaneously to suggest that the Security Council
meet to adopt a new resolution on the matter.41
The resulting Security Council resolution, resolution 760,
went beyond the need identified by the Committee for authorization for the relief activities of certain international humanitarian organizations. Instead, with Sanctions Committee approval under the "no-objection" procedure, any state or organization could now ship commodities and products "for essential humanitarian need" to the FRY.42
In contrast to resolution 687 on Iraq, which provided a list
of specific articles presumed to be "materials and supplies for
essential civilian needs,"' the Sanctions Committee decided

40. Id.
41. Id. at 5. See also Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to
Resolution 724 (1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 13th mtg. at 3, U.N.
Doc. S/AC.27/SR.13 (1992) (restricted).
42. S.C. Res. 760, supra note 2. Security Council Resolution 760 also provides
that the Security Council:
Decides that the prohibitions in paragraph 4(c) of Resolution 757 (1992)
concerning the sale or supply to the FRY of commodities or products,
other than medical supplies and foodstuffs, and the prohibitions against
financial transactions related thereto, contained in Resolution 757 (1992)
shall not apply, with the approval of the [Sanctions Committee] under
the simplified and accelerated "no objection" procedure, to commodities
and products for essential humanitarian need.
S.C. Res. 760, supra note 2.
43. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2981st mtg. 1 20, U.N. Doc. S/Res/687 (1991)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 687]. The Security Council decided that the sanctions on
Iraq
shall not apply to foodstuffs notified to the [Sanctions Committee] or with
the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and accelerated "no
objection" procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs
as identified in the report of the Secretary General dated 20 March 1991,
and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee.
Id. The referenced Secretary-General's report lists a variety of items related to
agriculture production, water, sanitation, and health including: fertilizers, pesticides, veterinary drugs, agricultural machinery, water purification equipment, sanitation equipment, and battery-operated incubators. See Letter from Javier Perez de
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not to attempt to formulate a guiding list of exempted humanitarian items for Yugoslavia. Rather, the Committee stated that
it preferred to "consider specific questions" concerning proposed
humanitarian exports to the FRY "on a case by case basis, as
they arise.""
As interpreted by the Committee, the scope of the humanitarian exception was held to encompass a wide variety of goods
and services, most of which were of no surprise to the international community. Such commodities as medicines, foodstuffs,
emergency shelters, and clothing were consistently approved
by the Sanctions Committee on a routine basis. Despite an
inherent risk of diversion, the Committee also routinely approved the shipment of items that were not themselves of a
humanitarian nature, but were related to the transport and
distribution of food and medicine.
There were, however, several cases that the Committee
rejected which seemed at first blush to serve a clear humanitarian purpose. In one such case, the Committee "could find no
justification based on humanitarian need" for the shipment to
Serbia of boxes of matches.' Though the record of the
Committee's discussion of the case sheds little light on its
motives, it is likely that the Committee's rejection was related
to the time of the year (summer), the large number of matches
requested (3 million boxes), and, in particular, the fact that
Serbians were reported to have engaged in widespread burning
of Bosnian towns and villages.47 In a similar vein, the Committee denied the FRY's request for heating oil "for the operation of purely humanitarian institutions... during the ap-

Cuellar, Secretary-General, to President of the Security Council (March 20, 1991)
(U.N. Doc. S/22366).
44. Letter from the Sanctions Committee to the Permanent Mission of
Slovenia (June 12, 1992) (U.N. Dc. S/AC.27/1992/OC.26).
45. See, e.g., Letter from Jose Ayala Lasso, Chairman of Sanctions Committee,
to Sir David Hannay, KCMG, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Permanent Mission of the United
Kingdom (Dec. 31, 1992), (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/0C.2170) (authorizing the shipment of a Land Rover 110 station wagon for use by the charity OXFAM in distributing food in Serbia).
46. See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution -724
(1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 16th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.27/SR.16 (1992) (restricted) [hereinafter S/AC.27/SR.16].
47. See, e.g., U.N. ESCOR, 1st Sess., Agenda Item 3, at 2, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1992/S-119 (1993).
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proaching winter season," in the absence of "a system to moni-

tor the final use of the oil" in light of its potential military applications.'
On the other hand, the Committee has approved many

items that would seem to be dubious candidates for the humanitarian exception, including cigarettes,49 chocolate
bars, 0 potato chips,5 wine, and vodka. 2 While it is true
that enumerating legitimate items of essential humanitarian
need might indeed be impractical, there seems to be no reason

why the Sanctions Committee could not develop a short list of
items, including cigarettes and vodka, deemed to fall outside
the humanitarian exception. The denial of such items would
likely have a strong psychological impact on the Serb population.5 3 To date, however, such suggestions5 4have not been
well received within the Sanctions Committee.
2. Pharmaceutical Precursors
The United States member of the Sanctions Committee
initially took the position that pharmaceutical precursors
(chemicals used in the production of finished pharmaceutical
products) should not be permitted under the humanitarian

exception of resolution 757 as "supplies intended strictly for
medical purposes." Here, as distinct from dual-use military

48. See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724
(1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 36th mtg. at 3-7, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.27/SR.36 (1992) (restricted) [hereinafter S/AC.27/SR.36].
49. Letter from Jos4 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of Sanctions Committee, to Mr.
Slavi Pashovski, Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations
(Nov. 30, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/OC.1639); Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso,
Chairman of Sanctions Committee, to Mr. Svetlomir Baev, Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations (July 20, 1992) (U.N. Doc.
S/AC.27/1992/0C.234).
50. Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of Sanctions Committee, to Mr.
Thomas L. Richardson, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom
to the United Nations (Nov. 13, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/OC.1475).
51. Letter from the Sanctions Committee to the Permanent Mission of the
Netherlands to the United States (July 10, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/OC.151).
52. Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee, to
Mr. Slavi Pashovski, Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations
(Nov. 11, 1992) (U.N." Doc. S/AC.27/1992/OC.1415).
53. Cigarettes could be denied on the basis of their adverse health effects and
vodka could be denied on the basis of its potential military application (i.e., as a
"Molotov cocktail").
54. See Interview with Frederick Baron, supra note 5.
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items, the risk was not that the chemicals would be used for
non-humanitarian purposes. Rather, in the view of the United
States, the danger was that the pharmaceutical precursors
would be used .t& keep the FRY's sizeable pharmaceutical industry in operation (and thereby prop up the FRY's economy)
rather than for immediate domestic consumption.55 The United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and Russia, on the other hand,
argued that opposing the import of components for the FRY
pharmaceutical industry would prevent the FRY from producing necessary drugs and6 might create additional needs for
humanitarian assistance.
Since it was isolated on the issue, the United States reluctantly withdrew is objection, 57 but subsequently urged the
Committee to revisit its decision to allow shipments of pharmaceutical precursors when the Committee received reports
that companies in the FRY were exporting finished
pharmaceuticals in contravention of the ban on exports established by the sanctions regime.5,s The Sanctions Committee
responded by restricting imports of pharmaceutical precursors
to companies which had been identified as exporting finished
pharmaceuticals.59 Thus, upon notification by a finn of its
55. See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724
(1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 18th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.27/SR.18 (1992) (restricted).
56. Id at 7-8.
57. See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724
(1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 21st mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.27/SR.21 (1992) (restricted) [hereinafter S/AC.27/SR.21].
58. See, e.g., Letter from James C. Ngobi, Secretary of the Sanctions Committee, to Professor Ibrahim A. Gambari, Permanent Representative of Nigeria (Nov.
30, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/199210C.1778) (requesting Nigerian authorities to
undertake investigations of the origin of "pharmaceutical goods intercepted in
Greece which were apparently under export from ... the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to .. . Nigeria.").
The Sanctions Committee previously ruled that the sanctions prohibited the
FRY even from exporting medical supplies urgently needed in Ethiopia, making it
clear that the humanitarian exception applied to exports to the FRY, not exports
from the FRY. See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution
724 (1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 14th mtg. at 6. U.N. Doc.
S/AC.27/SR.14 (1992) (restricted).
59. Beginning in November 1992, the Sanctions Committee began to deny,
pending -investigation, exports of precursors to companies in the FRY which*were
suspected of violating the ban on exports by exporting finished pharmaceuticals
abroad. See, e.g., Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of Sanctions Committee,
to Bent Haakansen, Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations
(Nov. 9, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/199210C.1400) (The letter states: "The Commit-
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intention to export precursors to specified FRY pharmaceutical
companies, the Sanctions Committee would place a "hold" on
the transaction pending an examination of the probable end
use of the product.
Repeated requests by the Sanctions Committee for investigations of illegal exports of finished pharmaceuticals by several
FRY firms were ignored or deflected by FRY officials with
denials that such transactions had occurred.6" Finally, in February of 1993, the Sanctions Committee decided to prohibit all
exports to the eight FRY firms identified as having engaged in
illegal exports until FRY authorities provided the Committee
with the complete report on the exportation of pharmaceuticals
from Serbian firms to Slovenia.6" The information was never
provided. Consequently, pharmaceutical precursors cannot be
exported to the FRY under the exception for "supplies intended
strictly for medical purposes" when there is reason to believe
that the precursors will be used for export purposes rather
than for domestic medical consumption.
3. The Exception for Humanitarian Remittances/Pensions
Paragraph five of resolution 757 proscribes the remittance
of "any funds" to persons or bodies within the FRY, "except
payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian
purposes and foodstuffs." 2 While the Committee routinely
approved requests by international humanitarian organizations
such as UNICEF, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
and the World Food Programme to transfer funds into the FRY
for their activities,' it struggled with a range of cases involv-

tee deem[s] it necessary to undertake further inquiries so as to ascertain whether
or not the end use of the indicated shipment would contravene the sanctions measures imposed . . .in resolution 757.").

60. See, e.g., Letter from Ronaldo Mote Sardenberg, Chair of the Sanctions
Committee, to Dragomir Djokic, Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia to the U.N. (Feb, 3, 1993) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1993/0C.521).
61. Id
62. S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, T 5.
63. See Letter from Jos4 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to James P. Grant, Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund,
(Oct. 30, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/OC.1293) (authorizing UNICEF to transfer
funds on a monthly basis to its Belgrade office in order to finance local operational and office expenses); Letter from Jos4 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions
Committee, to Santiago Romero, Acting Director of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Nov. 12, 1992) (U.N. Doc.
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ing direct "humanitarian" payments to persons in the FRY.
On one end of the spectrum were the cases of obvious
humanitarian need, such as the Committee's approval of a
request for a Netherlands-based organization to make monthly
remittances amounting to $3,840 to several hundred Yugoslav
children orphaned in the hostilities.' Falling in the middle of
this range of cases was a request by Greece for authorization
to make remittances to Greek students studying in the FRY.
Rather than give a blanket authorization for all students
studying in the FRY, the Committee confined its authorization
to exceptional cases and to students who were about to complete their studies.65
At the other end of the spectrum was the tricky issue of
pension payments to individuals in the FRY. The Sanctions
Committee initially took a restrictive view of the authority of
states to transfer pension payments to individuals in the FRY
under the remittance clause of resolution 757. While the members of the Committee recognized the general humanitarian
nature of pensions,66 some members were concerned by the
amount of hard currency which these payments could make
available to FRY authorities.6 According to one* estimate,
payment of such benefits would make available to the FRY
some $1.5 billion per year in foreign exchange.6"
The Sanctions Committee first considered the question of
allowing pension payments to be made when the government

S/AC.27/992/OC.1447) (authorizing UNHCR and the World Food Programme to
undertake purchases and related transactions in Serbia for the implementation of
certain humanitarian assistance projects in the FRY).
64. See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724
(1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 27th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.27/SR.27 (1992) [hereinafter S/AC.27/SR.27] (restricted).
65. See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724
(1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 11th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.27/SR.11 (1992) (restricted).
66. See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724
(1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 9th mtg. at 3-5, U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/SR.9
(1992) (restricted).
67. See S/AC.27/SR.10, supra note 12, at 3 (The U.S. representative "said it

was his Government's position that it was important for the sanctions to cover
remittances of, funds to Serbia and Montenegro, as the Yugoslav Government

would attempt to manipulate such transfers for its own advantage, and it had
therefore prohibited all such remittances involving transfers from United States
banks.").
68. See S/AC.27/SR.21, supra note 57, at 5.
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of Australia requested the Committee's view "on the possibility
of continuing to pay out pension funds to eligible Australian
recipients in Serbia and Montenegro."69 The Committee rejected the request for a blanket authorization for pension payments as over-broad, but stated that this decision would not
prejudice the Committee's position in considering more specific
requests in the future.7" During the next several months, in
response to similar requests for blanket authorization for pension payments, the Committee consistently reconfirmed that it
would only approve individual requests on a case-by-case demonstration of humanitarian need.71
This position, however, gradually changed as it became
apparent that some states continued to transfer pensions without consulting with the Sanctions Committee, since paragraph
5 of resolution 757 did not require notification to or authorization by the Sanctions Committee before making humanitarian
payments. Since it lacked a mechanism by which to control
such payments, the Committee, by the fall of 1992, decided to
turn the matter completely over to the individual states, determining that in appropriate circumstances such remittances
would not violate resolution 757, and that it was for individual
states to determine whether such payments were warranted in
each case.72
4. The Diplomatic Exception
Although the sanctions resolutions do not contain an express exception for the operation of diplomatic missions, the
Sanctions Committee has interpreted the sanctions resolutions

69. See Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to Richard Butler, Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations
(June 11, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1991/OC.19).
70. Id See S/AC.27/SR.10, supra note 12, at 4. An alternative approach that
the Committee apparently did not consider was to authorize pension payments
limited to a specific amount (e.g., $200.00).
71. See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724

(1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N.

SCOR,

14th mtg.

at

7,

U.N.

Doc.

S/AC.27/SR.14 (1992); see also S/AC.27/SR.21, supra note 57, at 4; Letter from Jos6
Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee, to Dragominr DJokic, Permanent Representative of the FRY to the United*Nations (July 15, 1992) (U.N. Doc.
S/AC.27/199210C.222).
72. See Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to Dragomir Djokic, Permanent Representative of the FRY to the United Nations
(Nov. 20, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/0C.1555).
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as containing such an exception "to maintain the normal functioning of diplomatic missions in accordance with the norms of
international law."7" Citing the precedent of allowing diplomatic missions to continue functioning despite the imposition
of the Iraqi sanctions regime, the Committee determined that
"the embargo did not apply to imports and exports for the sole
needs of embassies and consular missions or the import and
export of personal household effects of diplomats and non-diplomats."74
The Committee later clarified that its reference to the
"norms of international law" was to the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations of 1961.7' The Vienna Convention provides for entry into the receiving state of "articles for the official use of the Mission" and "articles for the personal use of a
diplomatic agent or members of his family forming part of his
household, including articles intended for his establishment."7 6 The Convention also provides that "the receiving
State shall accord full facilities for the performance of the
functions of the mission," that "the diplomatic bag shall not be
opened or detained," and that the diplomatic agent's papers,
correspondence, and property "shall enjoy inviolability. 7 The
Vienna Convention does not, however, address the continuing
shipment of goods to diplomatic missions during a UN imposed
economic embargo.
As the Sanctions Committee has pointed out in another
context, "under the Charter of the United Nations and the
relevant resolutions of the Security Council [states have the]

73. See S/AC.27/SR.10, supra note 12, at 6. The Committee's ruling on this
matter was in response to a communication by Greece "requesting an interpretation as to whether the embargo applied to imports and exports for the sole needs
of embassies, diplomatic, and consular missions." See S/AC.27/SR.10 supra note 12,
at 6.
74. See Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 724
(1991) Concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 10th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.27/SR.1o (restricted). The Committee's view that the sanctions do not cover
the personal household affects of "non-diplomats" is justified under the "repatriation" exception discussed briefly in the text accompanying note 105, infra, rather
than the diplomatic exception.
75. See UN Press Release, Department of Public Information (May 11, 1993)
(U.N. Doc. SC/5615).
76. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 36, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
77. Id. arts. 25, 27.
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obligation to implement the sanctions regime notwithstanding
the existence of any rights or obligations under any other international agreement.""8 In the absence of an express provision creating a diplomatic exception, or any references in the
record to the Security Council's intention that such a residual
exception should be read into the sanctions resolutions, the
Sanctions Committee could have ruled that the sanctions override the above provisions of the Vienna Convention. Indeed,
this would seem to have been the intention of the Security
Council as evinced by paragraph 8 of resolution 757, which
requires states to reduce the number of staff at FRY diplomatic missions within their territory. Instead, based on its Iraqi
precedent and perhaps a desire to facilitate diplomatic pressure on the FRY through continuing diplomatic contact in
Belgrade, the Sanctions Committee took the position that the
sanctions were not intended to prohibit shipments to or from
diplomatic missions and their personnel in the FRY in accordance with the Vienna Convention. While "diplomatic shipments," therefore, do not require specific Sanctions Committee
approval, states frequently notify the Sanctions Committee of
such shipments in advance to obtain from the Committee a
document confirming that the sanctions are not applicable to
the shipment.79
Consistent with the international law principle of reciprocity, the Sanctions Committee has also opined that the sanctions "should not impede the normal functioning" of FRY diplomatic and consular missions abroad. Consequently, the Committee has ruled that bank accounts for the sole purpose of
FRY diplomatic and consular missions are exempt from the
sanctions.8 " However, the Committee has narrowly construed

78. See Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to M. Gheorghe Chirila, Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Nations
(Aug. 26, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/OC.592) [hereinafter Romanian Letter).
79. See, e.g., Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee to Slavi Pashovski, Permanent Mission of Bulgaria to the United Nations
(Nov. 30, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/OC.1683) (notification of a shipment of
three tons of gasoline for the Bulgarian Embassy in Belgrade); Letter from Jos6
Ayala, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee to Peter Osvald, Permanent Mission
of Sweden to the United Nations (Nov. 25, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/0C.1635)
(notification of shipment of a 1992 Volvo 740 GL automobile).
80. See Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to Dragomir Djokic, Permanent Mission of the FRY to the United Nations (July
13, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/OC.172).
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this exception. For example, when the FRY requested the
Committee's authorization for the release of its embassy's
funds on deposit with Jugobanka, New York, which the United
States government had frozen, the Committee responded "that
several banks in the United States are licensed to carry accounts of the FRY, and that the Government is free to deposit
fresh funds into those accounts for the use of its embassies and
consulates abroad."8 '
5. Informational Materials Exception
Yet another exception to the sanctions created by the
Sanctions Committee pertains to informational materials such
as mail, newsprint for nongovernmental newspaper operations,
and broadcasting equipment for the independent media in the
FRY. The Committee has justified this exception on the ground
that the particular informational material was not a commodity or product, or that it fell within the essential humanitarian
need exception.
On August 12, 1992, the Sanctions Committee had occasion to rule on the application of the sanctions to parcel post
delivery in response to a request by Belgium for advice on the
transport operations of the company DHL International, based
in Belgrade, which is a subsidiary of DHL Worldwide Express,
Brussels. 2 On the ground that there were no specific provisions within Security Council Resolution 757 limiting or prohibiting the delivery of mail to or from the FRY, the Committee stated that it had no objection to the continued transport
operations by the subsidiary of the Belgium company.' This
ruling created a gaping loophole in the embargo. Under this
ruling, many otherwise prohibited items can be shipped into
the FRY via the mails and DHL without limitation on size,
weight, or value.
In the fall of 1992, the United States requested the Sanctions Committee's approval to grant licenses to several non-

81. See Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to Drasomir Djokic, Permanent Mission of the FRY to the United Nations (July
16, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/0C.224).
82. See Letter from Jos Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to Paul Noterdaeme, Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations
(Aug. 12, 1990) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/OC.415).
83. Id.
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profit, philanthropic organizations to supply independent, democratic media organizations in Serbia-Montenegro with essen-

tial technical equipment which would enable them to continue
their independent and democratic reporting of events in Yugoslavia.' The United States argued that the supplies should
be allowed under the humanitarian exception to the sanctions
because the continued operation of independent, democratic
media in Serbia-Montenegro was essential for the fulfillment of
the Yugoslav people's fundamental right to freedom of information as recognized in Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 of the International Covenant
on Political and Civil Rights, and Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.' On November 19, the Sanctions Committee approved the request, along with a similar
request by the United Kingdom, on condition that the proper
use of the equipment would be monitored by the International
Media Fund, a United States nongovernmental organization,
and that any suspected misuse or diversion of the equipment
would be reported promptly to the Committee.8 6

84. See Unclassified State Department Cable 247697 to the U.S. Mission to
the United Nations, captioned "support for democratic initiatives" (Aug. 1, 1992)
(on file with author). See also Letter from the Deputy Permanent Representative
of the United States to the Chairman of the United Nations Sanctions Committee
(Nov. 24, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/Comm.1647). The organizations were the
International Media Fund, the Open Society Fund, and the National Endowment
for Democracy. The items to be supplied consisted of computer hardware and software, television broadcasting equipment and office equipment. The media organizations that would receive these supplies were Studio B (TV), Naplo magazine, Monitor magazine, Pancevac newspaper, and Radio Pancevac. Id.
85. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, reprinted in EDMOND
OSMANCZYK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (2d ed. 1990). Article 19, of the Universal Declaration states: "Everyone has
the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and the right to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." Id. Nearly identical
language is contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. The underlying argument would be as follows: (1) the continued operation of SerbiaMontenegro's independent media depends on their receiving the equipment at
issue; and, (2) because the continued operation of independent media is related to
the human rights of the Serbian people, there is a "humanitarian need" for the
equipment.
86. See Letter from Jos Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to Thomas L. Richardson, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United King-
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Once it had been established that television and radio
equipment could be supplied to independent media under the
"humanitarian exception" to the sanctions, France quickly
submitted a request to supply newsprint, magazine paper, and
other supplies to four independent press organizations in Serbia.17 The Committee approved the request without any special conditions. While an exception to support the continued
operation of the independent (anti-government) media promotes the goals of the sanctions, the rationale for the exception
(i.e., freedom of information) leaves the Sanctions Committee
with no principled basis to deny similar exports for government controlled media.
6. The Transshipment Exception
Perhaps the single largest flaw in the sanctions regime
was the initial decision by the Security Council to permit the
transshipment of goods across the territory of the FRY as a
general exception to the sanctions.' While the Sanctions
Committee worked for several months following the adoption of
resolution 757 to standardize approval procedures, ultimately

dom to the United Nations (Nov. 19, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/0C.1546);
Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee, to Alexander
F. Watson, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United
Nations (Dec. 7, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/199210C.1770).
Ironically, on December 31, 1992, the United Kingdom reported to the Sanctions Committee that the equipment had been hijacked upon crossing the Hungarian-Serbian border. See Letter from T.L. Richardson, Charge d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom, to the Chairman of the U.N. Sanctions
Committee (Jan. 7, 1993) (U.N. Doc. SIAC.27/1993/Comm.9). The Chairman of the
Sanctions Committee then wrote the Permanent Mission of the FRY demanding
that it take all necessary steps to locate the diverted equipment and ensure its
delivery. See Letter from Jos4 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to Dragomir Djokic, Permanent Mission of the FRY to the United Nations (Dec.
30, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/199210C.2128).
87. See Letter from Jos4 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to Harv6 Ladsous, Deputy Permanent Representative of France to the United
Nations (Nov. 25, 1992) (U.N. Doec. S/AC.27/1992/0C.1649).
88. S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, T 6. Pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 757, paragraph 6, the Security Council:
Decides that the prohibitions in paragraphs 4 and 5 [preventing the
exportation to and importation from the FRY of all commodities] shall
not apply to the transshipment through the FRY of commodities and
products originating outside the FRY and temporarily present in the
territory of the FRY only for the purpose of such transshipment ....
S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, T 6.
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conveyances carrying "transshipped" goods provided the single
largest source of illegal commodities imported into the FRY.89
The regime as established by resolution 757, under whose
terms commodities were allowed to cross FRY borders without
the approval of the Sanctions Committee, 90 was fraught with
problems. First, use of the term "transshipment" initially
caused confusion among those charged with implementing the
sanctions on the borders of the FRY. "Transshipment" is generally understood as describing the process whereby goods being
shipped are transferred from one form of conveyance to another-such as from a ship to a truck-en route to a final destination. As used in resolution 757, however, the term embraced a
different meaning: namely, the routing, either in one form of
conveyance or by any number of conveyances, of goods from
one country to another country through the territory of the
FRY. As the Sanctions Committee made clear, the purpose of
the resolution was to limit the transfer of goods into the FRY,
not across its territory to other countries. Thus, the Sanctions
Committee issued an interpretation stating clearly that the
term "transshipment" as used in the sanctions resolutions "is
to be construed as including 'transit! as well."9 '
A second problem concerning the interpretation of the
transshipment clause was raised when the FRY demanded
that tolls be paid for the use of roads, creating a tension between paragraph 5's prohibition on making available to the
FRY "funds and economic resources" and operative paragraph
6's statement that such prohibitions "shall not apply" to transshipment. The Sanctions Committee approved a Greek payment of tolls to authorities of the FRY "since it is a basic requirement of such transshipment, which is permitted under
the terms of resolution 757. "92 The FRY took advantage of

this ruling to require the payment of exorbitant transit charges

89. See generally GAO, supra note 13.
90. See Guidelines of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to
Resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 13th mtg. T 10, U.N.
Doc. S/AC.27/1992/CRP.7/Rev.3 (1992) [hereinafter Guidelines].
91. See Letter from Jos4 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to Victor H: Batiouk, Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations (Jan.
21, 1993) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/199310C.107).
92. See Letter from Sanctions Committee, to Ambassador Antonias Exarchos,
Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations (June 12, 1992) (U.N.
Doc. S/AC.28/1992/0C.24).
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from vessels passing through the FRY portion of the Danube
River, which became a major source of foreign currency.93
The Security Council attempted to address these difficulties in resolution 787 and the revised guidelines which accompanied the new sanctions. This resolution strictly limited the
types of commodities which could be transshipped and required
transshipment to be approved by the Sanctions Committee
under its no-objection procedure.94 The resolution further
tightened the regime by requiring countries of destination to
report to the Sanctions
Committee upon completion of the
95
transshipment.
While the language of resolution 787 did address many of
the legal problems created by the imprecision of resolution 757,
the transshipment regime continued to prove unworkable in
practice. Most importantly, the Sanctions Committee, through
the Sanctions Assistance Missions (SAMs) and authorities in
the front-line states, was unable adequately to monitor and
enforce the regime. Documents continued to be
forged-approval letters themselves were often forged, but
more frequently lists attached to approval letters (which themselves bore no official stamp or other markings) were changed
to reflect items which were left behind or added to shipments.98
Acknowledgment that the transshipment regime was unworkable, combined with escalated aggression by Bosnian
Serbs against Bosnian Moslems in the spring of 1993, led to a
growing consensus among states that transshipments should
be totally banned. Accordingly, resolution 820-adopted on
April 17, 1993, nearly one year after the establishment of the

93. See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United
Nations to the President of the Security Council (May 12, 1993) (U.N. Doc.
S125808) [hereinafter Hungarian Letter].
94. S.C. Res. 787, supra note 2,
9. Resolution 787(9) attempted to ensure
that transshipped goods would not be diverted to the FRY by prohibiting the
transshipment of crude oil, petroleum products, coal, energy-related equipment,
iron, steel, other metals, chemicals, rubber, tires, vehicles, aircraft, and motors of
all types unless specifically authorized on a case-by-case basis by the Sanctions
Committee under its no-objection procedure. S.C. Res. 787, supra note 2,
9.
95. See Guidelines, supra note 90, $ 10(c). Paragraph 10(c) of the Guidelines
required a confirmation from receiving states that authorized transshipments were
received in good order and in conformity with the particulars as restated in the
letter of authorization. Guidelines, supra note 90.
96. GAO, supra note 13, at 22.
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ban on imports and exports in resolution 757--established a
complete ban on all land transfers of commodities into the
territory of the FRY,97 and severely restricted transshipment
on the Danube.9"
The failure of the transshipment regime can be attributed
both to poorly constructed provisions and to practical problems.
By failing adequately to establish limits on the types of commodifies and products which could be transshipped, resolution
757 allowed considerable amounts of fuel, machinery, and
other economic resources to enter the territory of the FRY,
where they were frequently off-loaded (either by plan or
against the wishes of the shippers) and used by the authorities
of the FRY. Also, the earlier resolution did not provide any
notification requirement upon completion of the transfer of
commodities. Accordingly, there was no mechanism by which
to verify that transshipment had been completed.
Most importantly, however, the regime as established was
largely unworkable as a matter of practice. The international
community was unable, or unwilling, to commit sufficient re-,
sources to monitor the implementation of the regime. First,
with limited resources it proved impossible to verify the contents of shipments. Second, it was difficult for SAM teams to
verify the authenticity of documents. Finally, the SAM teams
were unable to monitor effectively the departure of conveyances in order to verify that goods which entered the FRY also
departed the FRY.
C. Imports from the FRY
At first blush, the sanctions provision prohibiting the importation of goods from the FRY appears to be among the most
succinct and clear of those contained in the sanction resolutions. Specifically, resolution 757(4)(a) obligates states to prevent "the import into their territories of all commodities and

97. S.C Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 3200th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/Res/820 (1993)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 820]. Resolution 820(13) obligates states to prevent diversion
to the territory of the FRY of commodities and products said to be destined for
other places. Id.
15. Resolution 820(15) permits transshipment of commodities
98. Id at 4,
and products through the FRY on the Danube "only if specifically authorized by
the [Sanctions Committee] and only if each vessel so authorized is subject to effective monitoring while passing along the Danube." Id.
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products originating in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) exported therefrom after the date of
the present resolution."99 However, much in the same way
that the Sanctions Committee identified and implemented
"implied" exceptions to the sanctions regime's ban on exports
to the FRY in the cases of the diplomatic exception0 0 and
the informational materials exception,1 ' the Sanctions Committee also carved exceptions to the complete ban on imports
for cases involving "religious objects" and for cases of "repatriation" from the FRY of goods belonging to other states.
The religious objects exception was established in October
1992, when the Sanctions Committee approved the importation
from the FRY of a religious sculpture commissioned by a Serbian Orthodox Church in the United States. The Committee
approved the shipment despite its recognition that "Resolution
757 did not specifically authorize such transactions"0 2 since
the humanitarian exception only applied to exports to, not
imports from, the FRY. 3 In doing so, the Committee employed the peculiar rationale that the sculpture was a "religious object, not a commodity" and therefore not subject to the
rationale would exempt from the
sanctions provisions. 104 This ra
sanctions a host of other religious objects including paintings,
figurines, bibles, and even religious text books.
In one of its first repatriation cases, the Sanctions Committee decided in July 1992 to authorize the return of a Turkish-registered aircraft which had been sent to the FRY for
servicing prior to the adoption of resolution 757.105 Also in
July, the Sanctions Committee authorized the return from the
FRY of fabrics belonging to Liz Claiborne, Inc., which had not
yet been processed into finished textile products.'
The Sanctions Committee strictly confined its repatriation
exception to cases in which the items (1) were only temporarily

99. S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2.
100. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
102. See S/AC.27/SR.36, supra note 48, at 11.
103. See supra note 58.
104. See S/AC.27/SR.36, supra note 48, at 11.
105. See S/AC.27/SR.21, supra note 57, at 7.
106. See Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to Edward J. Perkins, Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations
(July 24, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/OC.300).
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present in the FRY, and (2) were not in any way altered or
processed while in the FRY. For example, the Committee refused Egypt's request for repatriation of equipment in the
absence of more detailed information indicating "the exact
nature and value" of the repairs rendered in the FRY."' Nor
was the Committee willing to authorize repatriation where
goods had been bought and paid for prior to the imposition of
sanctions under the repatriation exception. Thus, the Committee refused a request by Mongolia for repatriation of hotel
furniture it had purchased from a FRY company before the,
Security Council's adoption of resolution 757 but which had not
yet been shipped when the sanctions were imposed.1 08 Although several members of the Committee were sympathetic to
the argument that this was merely a routine repatriation case
since title had passed to Mongolia before the imposition of
sanctions, authorization was denied because "without a mechanism to monitor and investigate such kinds of transactions, it
would be impossible to verify claims that the goods to be exported from the FRY had been paid for before 30 May
1992.1 ° 9

A repatriation exception to the prohibition on imports from
the sanctioned states makes good sense. The denial of repatriation claims only injures the property owners outside of the
sanctioned state. Indeed, the sanctioned state could arguably
refuse to release such property, in effect making a de facto
expropriation, by shielding itself under the language of the
sanctions. As such, future sanctions regimes would do well to
include an explicit provision allowing the repatriation of property stranded in sanctioned states. This exception should also
include cases in which title to property has passed prior to
imposition of sanctions such as in the Mongolia furniture case,
provided that the requesting state provides the Committee
with specific information verifying that the merchandise in
question was fully paid for prior to the imposition of sanctions.

107. See S/AC.27/SR.36, supra note 48, at 9.
108. See S/AC.27/SR.36, supra note 48, at 6; see also S/AC.27/SR.27, supra note
64, at 4.
109. See S/AC.27/SR27, supra note 64, at 2.
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D. The Maritime Sanctions
1. FRY Vessels
After the imposition of the sanctions, the FRY continued to
trade through its sizeable merchant fleet in circumvention of
the Security Council resolutions. The application of the sanctions to FRY vessels thus became an increasingly important
issue for the Sanctions Committee. While the language of resolution 757 does not explicitly cover such vessels, two of its
provisions were potentially applicable: paragraph 4(c) provides
that all states are required to prevent any activities in their
territories which promote or are calculated to promote trade
benefitting the FRY,11 and paragraph 5 provides that all
states are required not to make available to the FRY "any
funds or any other financial or economic resources.""'

110. See S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, T 4(c). Paragraph 4(c) of Resolution 757
reads:
Decides that all States shall prevent: . . . The sale or supply by their
nationals or from their territories or using their' flag vessels or aircraft of
any commodities or products, whether or not originating in their territories, but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and
foodstuffs notified to the Committee established pursuant to resolution
724 (1001), or to any person or body for the purpose of any business
carried on in, or operated from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply
of such commodities or products.
See S.C. Res. 757, supra note 4, T 4c. This provision would apply if providing port
services to FRY vessels was deemed an activity which promotes trade with the
FRY.
111. See S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, 1 5 (Emphasis added). Paragraph 5 of
Resolution 757 provides:
Decides that all States shall not make available to the authorities in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), any fimds or any other financial
or economic resources and shall prevent their nationals and any persons
within their territories from removing from their territories or otherwise
making available to those authorities or to any such undertaking of any
such funds or resources and from remitting any other funds to persons or
bodies within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and foodstuffs.
S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, 9 5.
This provision can be read either to authorize the detention of FRY vessels
or to prohibit the provision of services to such vessels. For this provision to authorize detention of FRY vessels, vessels must be deemed to be an "economic re-
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In domestic litigation challenging the United States
government's seizure of four FRY-owned, Maltese-flagged vessels which called at United States ports, the United States
took the position that these provisions of resolution 757 authorized states to take appropriate action to prevent the continued
operation of FRY vessels.' 2 In response to the United States'
request for the Sanctions Committee's position on the matter-which the United States hoped to use to bolster its position in court-the Committee issued a ruling on August 28,
1992, stating: "in view of the fact that the vessels are apparently owned by majority interests in Montenegro, their continued operation and any payments related thereto would be in
violation of the sanctions established under resolution 757
(1992).""1
As is almost always the case with Sanctions Committee
communications, the Committee did not explain the basis for
its August 28, 1992 ruling. The ruling could be interpreted
either (1) as requiring states to prohibit the provision of services to FRY vessels (which in most cases would effectively preclude their entry into or departure from port) as the European
Community (EC) countries had done;" 4 or (2) as requiring
states actively to seize and impound FRY vessels that enter
their territorial waters-following the United States model. Although the question was largely rendered moot a year later
when the Security Council adopted resolution 820, which explicitly provides that states "shall impound" all FRY-interest
vessels as well as other vessels in their territories found to

source," and permitting FRY vessels to depart from a state's territorial jurisdiction
must be deemed making an economic resource available to the FRY. For this
provision to be read as prohibiting the provision of port services, the service itself
must be deemed an "economic resource," and FRY owned vessels must be deemed
an arm of the authorities or an undertaking operating in the FRY.
112. See Memorandum in Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion for A Preliminary
Injunction at 6, Milena Ship Management Co. v. Newcomb, 804 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.
La. 1992).
Ultimately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the
government's detention of the vessels, finding the government's interpretation of
the sanctions and implementing executive orders to be reasonable. See Milena Ship
Management Co. v. Newcomb, No. 92-3905, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 18355 (5th Cir.
July 21, 1993).
113. See Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to Alexander F. Watson, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States
(Aug. 28, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/OC.624).
114. See Council Regulation 1432/92, 1992 O.J. (,151) 4.
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have been in violation of the sanctions, the ambiguity of paragraphs 4(c) and 5 of resolution 757 resulted in much disparity
in the treatment of FRY vessels by states and consequently an
uneven application of the sanctions in the interim." 5 Moreover, while resolution 820 codifies the United States model, the
rulings of the Sanctions Committee suggest that it had in mind
the EC rule. For example, in one such case, the Committee
emphasized that "the provision of supplies, services or payments to vessels of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is
prohibited."'1 6
The Committee has developed a rather broad definition of
"vessels of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (applicable

24. Paragraph 24 of Security
115. See S.C. Res. 820, supra note 97, at 6,
Council Resolution 820 provides:
[AIll States shall impound all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and
aircraft in their territories in which a majority or controlling interest is
held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and that these vessels, freight
vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft may be forfeit to the seizing State
upon a determination that they have been in violation of resolutions 713
(1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution.
24. Paragraph 25 of the same Resolution proRes. 820, supra note 97, at 6,
vides:
[All States shall detain pending investigation all vessels, freight vehicles,
rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes found in their territories and suspected
of having violated or being in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757
(1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution, and that, upon a determination that they have been in violation, such vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft shall be impounded and, where appropriate, they
and their cargoes may be forfeit to the detaining State.
25. See S.C. Res. 713, supra note 2; S.C. Res. 757,
Res. 820, supra note 97,
supra note 2; S.C. Res. 787, supra note 2.
Resolution 661 (which imposed sanctions on Iraq) used the same "economic
resources" language as Resolution 757, S.C. Res. 661, SCOR 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/INF/46 (1990), and engendered similar confusion, some of which was alleviated
when the Security Council adopted Resolution 670, which called upon "all States
or to deny such
to detain any ships of Iraqi registry which enter their ports ...
ships entrance to their ports except in circumstances recognized under international law as necessary to safeguard human life." See S.C. Res. 670, SCOR 2943d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 670].
116. See Remanian Letter, supra note 78. In 1990, the U.N. Legal Counsel
issued an opinion interpreting the "economic resource" provision of Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) S.C. Res. 661, supra note 115, at 19-20, concerning Iraq
as prohibiting the provision of port services "such as the provision of water, supplies and fuel" to Iraqi and Kuwaiti vessels and vessels coming from or heading to
Kuwait or Iraq. See Letter from Carl-August Fleischhauer, the Under-SecretaryGeneral for Legal Affairs to the Chairman of the Iraqi Sanctions Committee (Oct.
3, 1990) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.25/1990/Note/18).
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under both interpretations). It has, for example, defined such
vessels to include FRY-flagged vessels, as well as "vessel[s]
owned wholly or partially by persons residing in or by companies registered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro)."" 7 The Committee has explained that "the
decisive question in determining whether sanctions should
apply to a given vessel is who exercises effective control over
the vessel, not simply what flag the vessel is flying."118 In another ruling, the Committee indicated that foreign owned and
registered vessels under contract with entities in the FRY
might be deemed to be FRY vessels for purposes of the sanc1 19
tions.
The Committee has also carved out several exceptions to
its prohibitions concerning FRY vessels. On December 17,
1992, for example, the Committee granted an exception "on the
basis of humanitarian considerations" for the provision of
"food, water and other humanitarian services to the crew" of
FRY vessels.' The Committee attempted to confine its exception by stating "the Committee does not authorize the unloading of the cargo, nor any maintenance or services to be

117. See Letter from the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee to the Netherlands Permanent Mission to the United Nations (Dec. 8, 1992) (U.N. Dc.
S/AC.27/1992/0C.1763) [hereinafter Netherlands Letter].
118. See Letter from the Sanctions Committee to the Permanent Mission of the
Netherlands (Sept. 29, 1992) (U.N. Dec. S/AC.27/1992/0C.865). Subsequently, the
Security Council codified this interpretation in paragraph 10 of Resolution 787
(Nov. 16, 1992), which provides:
The Security Council further decides, acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United Nations, that any vessel in which a majority or
controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be
considered, for the purpose of implementation of the relevant resolutions
of the Security Council, a vessel of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) regardless of the flag under which the vessel
sails.
S.C. Res. 787, supra note 2, S 10.
119. See Letter from Rnaldo Mota Sardenberg, Chairman of the Sanctions
Committee, to Victor H. Batiouk, Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United
Nations (Mar. 2, 1993) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1993/OC.1350) (The letter requested the
Ukrainian Government to investigate allegations that a Ukrainian flagged vessel,
"leased to a commercial enterprise in the Russian Federation, continues to be in
use under a contract with the firm Gori of Montenegro, which would be a violation of paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 757 (1992).").
120. See Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to Bent Haakonsen, Permanent Mission of Denmark (Dec. 17, 1992) (U.N. Doc.
S(AC.27/1992tOC.1954).
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provided to the vessel itself." 21 In a later case, the Committee explained further that "in case of extreme, life-threatening
emergencies of a humanitarian nature States may request the
approval of the Sanctions Committee to permit on an exceptional basis such [FRY] vessels to enter their port waters or
2
receive necessary services. " m2
Soon thereafter, the Committee created an exception to its
caveat prohibiting the unloading of cargo when it authorized
the Netherlands to unload from the Crna Gora, a FRY-owned
vessel, a cargo of 63,000 tons of hot coal, which was in danger
of spontaneous ignition.2 3 The Committee's communication
in that case explained that "the Committee's decision in this
instance is founded solely upon an appreciation of the assessment by the Netherlands authorities that the continued confinement of the cargo in question represents a serious safety
hazard" and the Committee's approval was made "on the condition that the cargo in question remains under impoundment by
the Netherlands authorities for the duration of the sanctions. " 24 Later, the Committee reversed itself on the last of
its conditions, ruling that the Crna Gora's cargo may be released provided "no funds or benefits related to the cargo
should be made available to entities in or operating from the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)."'
2. The Situation on the Danube
The Danube River flows 1,776 miles from Germany to the
Black Sea through the countries of Austria, Slovakia, Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria and the FRY. Shipping on the river is regulated by the 1948 Danube Convention, which guarantees freedom of navigation on the Danube. 6 The Danube constitutes

121. Id
122. Letter from the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee to Chew Tai Soo,
Permanent Representative of Singapore to the United Nations (Jan. 8, 1993) (U.N.
Doc. SIAC.27/1993/oC.58). While the Communication indicated that the Committee
expected states to apply to the Committee for authorization in such cases, it noted
that simple notification to the Committee would be appropriate in emergency situations in which the Committee's approval could not be sought in advance. Id.
123. See Netherlands Letter, supra note 117.
124. See Netherlands Letter, supra note 117.
125. See Draft Letter, supra note 34.
126. Convention Regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube, Aug. 18,
1948, 33 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter Danube Convention].
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a critical transportation link between Eastern Europe and
Western Europe, and therefore became a central focus of the
international community's efforts to disrupt trade with the
FRY.
In response to the position of the Danubian states that
their obligations under the Danube Convention prevented
them from taking any action against FRY or other vessels
violating the sanctions on the Danube, the Sanctions Committee informed the Danubian states that:
The special regime of the Danube under international conventions cannot affect the application of the sanctions regime
since, under the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, states must fulfill
their Charter obligations to implement the sanctions regime
notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations
under any other international agreement.127
In the face of continuing protestations by the Danubian
states concerning the extent of their authority to act on the
Danube, the Security Council adopted Security Council Resolution 787, which:
Reaffirms the responsibility of riparian states to take necessary measures to ensure that shipping on the Danube is in
accordance with resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992), including such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary to halt such shipping in
order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and
to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992). 128
Later, in light of continuing intransigence on the part of
the Danubian states to use force'to enforce the Sanctions on
the Danube, the Security Council issued a Presidential State127. See Romanian Letter, supra note 78. Under Articles 28 and 48 of the
U.N. Charter, members of the United Nations are obligated to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international
peace and security. U.N. CHARTER arts. 28, 48. The interference with international
navigation on the Danube would be conducted pursuant to the obligations of the
riparian states under such decisions. To the extent that the obligations of those
States under the Danube Convention, supra note 126, conflict with the obligations
under the U.N. Charter, Article 103 of the Charter provides that the Charter
obligations prevail. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
128. See S.C. Res. 787, supra note 2, T 13.
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ment calling on the Danubian states to enforce the Security
Council resolutions "vigorously" with respect to vessels on the
Danube and reminding them that "under Article 103 of the
Charter, the obligations of the Members of the United Nations
under the Charter shall prevail over their obligations under
any other international agreement." 2 9 In response, the members of the Danube Commission adopted a resolution which
stated:
The states members of the Danube Commission deem it essential to confirm officially that, in implementing the Security Council resolutions, they are guided by the following notions: (a) All obligations relating to the regime of navigation
on the Danube which are not affected by the sanctions must
continue to be fulfilled strictly; (b) Measures adopted in implementation of the Security Council resolutions which establish some limits on the regime of free navigation on the Danube should be regarded as being solely of a temporary nature.
Such measures related only to the actions taken with a view
to the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, and cannot influence the future regime of free navigation on the Danube. 3 °
After initial reluctance, the Danube states demonstrated
through this resolution their intent to actively enforce the
sanctions on the Danube.
When, consistent with the Sanctions Committee's August
1992 ruling, Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria began to detain
FRY vessels and other vessels on the Danube suspected of
violating the sanctions, a host of new issues arose. For example, in December 1992, Romania requested the Sanctions
Committee's authorization to release empty FRY vessels from
the port area of Galatzi on the Danube, where they were creating a dangerous situation due to the freezing of the river. The
Committee apprised Romania that it could find no grounds
upon which to approve that country's request.131 Two days

129. UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY COuNcIL, NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL, U.N. Doc. S/25270 (1993). [hereinafter PRESIDENTS NOTE]
130. See Hungarian Letter, supra note 93.
131. See Letter from Jose Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to Valeriu Florean, Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Nations (Dec. 22,
1992) (U.N. Doc. SIAC.27/1992/O.2067).
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later, the Committee reversed itself by approving the release of
the empty vessels on the following conditions:
That the Sanctions Assistance Mission (SAM) in the area will
be requested to verify that the vessels released for return to
Serbia and Montenegro are indeed empty, further, that in
approving the request to repatriate the vessels in question
the Committee is doing so on humanitarian and health
grounds in the present circumstances, and finally, that the
present exception, does not set a precedent
for any future
13 2
course of action in similar circumstances.
While explicitly denying the creation of precedent, the Sanctions Committee nevertheless in effect created a "safety exception" to the detention of FRY vessels as it had done earlier
with respect to the prohibition on providing services to FRY
vessels in the Crna Gora case.'33 Three weeks later, the
Sanctions Committee employed this same rationale in approving Romania's request to provide FRY authorities with fuel to
ensure the functioning of FRY ice-breaking vessels on the
Danube River.'4
The next month, the FRY retaliated against Romania for
detaining its vessels by seizing Romanian vessels on the Danube and threatening to seize more Romanian vessels unless
Romania allowed the passage of FRY vessels on the Danube." 5 Soon thereafter, the FRY increased the pressure by
using its vessels to blockade the Romanian "Iron Gates II"
lock, halting all upstream and downstream traffic on the Danube.31 6 The FRY also reportedly threatened to blow up the
levee at Prahovo with the purpose of changing the Danube's
course and diverting traffic passing through the Romanian

132. See Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee,
to Valeriu Florean, Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Nations (Dec. 24,
1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1992/OC.2106).
133. See supra note 123 and accompanying text discussing the Committee's
authorization for the Netherlands to off-load a cargo of hot coal from a FRY vessel.
134. Letter from Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee, to Valeriu Florean, Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Nations
(Jan. 18, 1993) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1993/OC.117).
135. See PRESIDEN'S NOTE, supra note 129.
136. See Letter from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria Addressed to
the President of the Security Council (Mar. 4, 1993) (U.N. Doc. S/25373).

1993]

YUGOSLAVIA SANCTIONS COMMITTEE

807

canal locks.1"' In response, the Security Council issued a
Presidential Statement demanding that the FRY immediately
desist from such unlawful retaliatory measures taken in response to actions by states in fulfillment1 8 of their obligations
under the Charter of the United Nations.
The members of the Sanctions Committee further urged
Romania to deny FRY vessels use of the Iron Gates II Lock,
which was on the Romanian side of the Danube. 139 Romania
argued, however, that "since the Romanian side does not impose any taxation on the Yugoslav vessels for the use of the
locks, this activity cannot be assimilated as 'providing services'
under paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 757
(1992). "14 The matter was settled a month later when the
Security Council included in resolution 820 a provision confirming that:
[N]o vessels (a) registered in the FRY or (b) in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking
in or operating from the FRY or (c) suspected of having violated or being in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757
(1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution shall be permitted to pass through installations, including river locks or
canals within the territory of member states.'41
3. Enforcement
In response to a request for the Committee's position on
what actions could and should be undertaken with respect to
vessels and their cargo in situations when violations of the
sanctions have been established, the Committee stated:
In view of the fact that full responsibility for the implementation of the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security
Council rests with states and, where specifically indicated,
international organizations, the Committee has noted that it
is up to each State to institute the measures to meet its obli-

137. Id.
138. See PRESIDENT'S NOTE, supra note 129.
139. See Letter from loan Voleu, the Charge d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Romania, to Chairman of the Sanctions Committee (Mar. 19, 1993) (U.N.
Doc. S/AC.27/1993/Comm.213/Add.B).
140. Id141. See S.C. Res. 820, supra note 97, at 4, 16.
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gations set out in the relevant Security Council resolutions,
including adoption of relevant national laws and/or procedures and their strict and effective implementation. The
Committee felt that such action should, inter alia, envisage
severe penal provisions, in accordance with appropriate
norms of international law, so as to prevent the ship to deliver prohibited cargo and to ensure that prohibited cargo does
not reach its final destination.
While a description of the measures taken by each country to
enforce the sanctions against FRY vessels and other sanctionviolating vessels is beyond the scope of this article, it is appropriate here to describe briefly those measures taken by the
United States, which have served as a model for other countries.
On March 11, 1993, the United States Department of
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control named twenty-five
maritime firms and fifty-five ships controlled, managed, or
operated by these firms as "Specially Designated Nationals" of
Yugoslavia. 4 3 These vessels are presumed to be owned or
controlled by the government of the FRY and, pursuant to
Executive Order, are subject to "blocking" if they come within
United States jurisdiction.'
Moreover, the regulatory prohibitions governing transactions by United States persons with
the government of the FRY are automatically extended to
these vessels. The United States Executive Orders also prohibit the import of any FRY-origin cargo into the United States
and the export to the FRY of cargo from the United States, and
vessels and their cargo found in violation of the Executive
Orders are subject to seizure and forfeiture to the United
145
States.
Though the United States enforcement actions appear
quite sweeping, several gaps still exist. For example, the Unit-

142. See Letter from Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg, Chairman of the Sanctions
Committee, to Slavi Pashovksi, Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations (Jan. 21, 1993) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/1993/OC.102).
143. See President's Message to the Congress Reporting on the National Emergency with Respect to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),
29 WKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 952 (May 31, 1993).
144. See Exec. Order 124,846-Additional Measures with Respect to the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 29 WKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 685
(May 3, 1993).
145. See 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(C) (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1988).
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ed States has no authority to take action against vessels that
are not FRY vessels and have not engaged in illegal importation into or exportation from the United States, but have in
the past engaged in third country trade with the FRY in violation of the Security Council sanctions. An effective way to
ground such sanction-busting vessels is for the state of the
vessel's registry to "de-flag" it and for other states to refrain
from re-flagging the vessel since, under international law,
ships without nationality are subject to arrest and detention by
any state.146 Without new legislative authority, however, the
United States is powerless to "de-flag" United States registered
vessels that have violated the sanctions147 or to refrain from
re-flagging
vessels that other countries have de-flagged for this
148
reason.

In light of the difficulties faced by individual states attempting to enforce the sanctions against non-FRY vessels
engaged in illegal trade with the FRY, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and the Western European Union placed
a joint naval task force in the Adriatic Sea to deter violations
of the sanctions. 49 Under the terms of resolution 787, this
multinational interdiction force was authorized to "use such
measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as
may be necessary under the authority of the Security Council
to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to
inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure
strict implementation of the provisions of resolutions 713
(1991) and 757 (1992). " "15 Because this measure proved to be
subject to easy circumvention by vessels falsely declaring that
the FRY was not their destination, the Security Council included in resolution 820 (1993) a provision "prohibit[ing] all
commercial maritime traffic from entering the territorial sea of
146. See generally Part VII of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (not yet entered into force). See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
501, comment c (1987) ("A ship that is not registered in any state ... is considered 'a ship without nationality'; it may be boarded by a war ship or other clearly
marked law enforcement ship of any state .... ).
147. See 46 U.S.C §§ 12110, 12122, and 12123 (Supp. 1993).
148. See 46 U.S.C. § 121, (1992) (United States law only requires that a vessel
"not [be] registered under the laws of a foreign country" at the time of application.).
149. See GAO, supra note 13.
150. See S.C. Res. 787, supra note 2, T112.
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the [FRY] except when authorized on a case-by-case basis by
the [Sanctions Committee]."' 5 ' This measure effectively imposed a naval blockade against the FRY.
E. Sporting Events
Paragraph 8(b) of resolution 757 obligates states to "prevent the participation in sporting events on their territory of
persons or groups representing the FRY." Immediately following the adoption of 757, the "Yugoslav" soccer team in Sweden
for the European Cup Finals was informed by the Swedish
government that it would not be allowed to participate.152
The United States government established guidelines for consular posts making eligibility determinations for athletes applying to come to the United States to participate in sporting
events.'53 FRY athletes already in the United States who did
not meet
the eligibility criteria were prohibited from compet54
ing.1
Adopted on May 30, 1992, this sanction provision led to
immediate questions concerning the extent to which athletes
from the FRY would be able to participate in the Olympic
Games scheduled to be held in Barcelona that summer. Initially, the International Olympic Committee (IOC)attempted
to develop a plan which would allow athletes from the FRY to

151. See S.C. Res. 820, supra note 97, at 6, T 28. The Resolution also clarifies
that force may be used "[in the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" to enforce the saxictions. See S.C. Res. 820, supra
note'97, at 6, T 29.
152. See Sweden Welcomes UN Sanctions Against Serbia and Montenegro, Unclassified State Department Cable 002745 from the U.S. Mission in Stockholm,
June 1, 1992.
153. See UN Sanctions Against Yugoslav Athletes, Unclassified State Department Cable to All Consular Posts, June 9, 1992. In determining eligibility, consular officers were instructed to ask. (a) whether the individual or group was sponsored by the Government of the FRY, the National Olympic Committee of the
FRY, or by a sporting federation located in the FRY; (b) whether the individual or
group purported to represent the FRY; and (c)whether recognition of the individual or group was given in the name of the FRY. An affirmative answer to any one
of these questions raised a presumption of ineligibility. Id.
154. See Letter from John R. Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs to Kae Browning, Executive Director of the U.S. Table
Tennis Association (requesting that two FRY athletes scheduled to compete in the
U.S. Open Table Tennis Championships be prohibited from entering the competition) (on file with authors).
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compete in the Olympics under the Olympic flag on a team
fully funded by the IOC.
After considering the question of FRY participation at four
meetings between July 16 and July 21, 1992, the Sanctions
Committee arrived at its final decision on the participation of
FRY athletes in the Summer Games. Noting that the Committee could be guided by no precedent or example, the Committee
decided that participation of athletes as private individuals
would not violate the provision, so long as: (1) it was clearly
evident that the athletes competed solely in their personal and
individual capacities; (2) the IOC assumed iesponsibility for
the selection of participating athletes; (3) the athletes were
accompanied only by trainers and not by any other personnel
or officials; and (4) the athletes refrained from making any
political statements or gestures. 5 5
The Sanctions Committee went on to state that athletes
should be limited to participation in individual sports, because
"participation... in team events would inevitably evoke representation of their country, and therefore would be in violation
of the relevant sanctions."' 5 6 The criteria established for participation in the Barcelona games have remained intact.
The reasoning underlying the Sanctions Committee's decision to limit participation to individual sports-that participation of more than one athlete "evoke[s] representation of' the
FRY-is curious. Paragraph 8(b) of resolution 757 expressly
determines that all states shall prevent participation in sporting events by persons or groups representing the FRY. The
provision implicates an affirmative intention, either on the
part of the athlete or the organization sponsoring the event,
that the individual or group represents the FRY. Absent such a
subjective intention, individuals-whether competing alone or
as part of a group-should be allowed to participate. Allowing
a figure skater to participate as an individual, while denying
the participation of the two individuals forming the figure
skating pair, seems to contradict the purpose of the provision.

155. See Letter from Jos6 Ayala Lasso, Chairman of the Sanctions Committee
to Don Juan Antonia Yafiez-Barnuevo (July 21, 1992) (U.N. Doc.
S/AC.27/1992/0C.283).
156. Id

812

BROOK. J. INTL L.

[Vol. XIX:3

II. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A Security Council Drafting and the Role of the Sanctions
Committee
The Security Council's sanctions resolutions contain a
myriad of open-ended and undefined terms. The above discussion is replete with examples of such vaguely drafted terms,
including resolution 713's reference to "military equipment,"
resolution 757's use of the phrase "economic resource," and
resolution 760's exception for "products for essential humanitarian need."' In some cases, such as with respect to the
continued operation of FRY vessels, the Security Council has
had to clarify the provisions of sanctions resolutions in subsequent resolutions or presidential statements. Sometimes this
has followed the Sanctions Committee's inability to reach consensus on an appropriate interpretation, and other times the
Council has merely ratified an earlier ruling by the Sanctions
Committee to lend it increased visibility and support. Frequently, however, the subsequent resolutions of the Security
Council have created confusion over whether the Council has
promulgated a new obligation on states or has merely clarified
an existing obligation. This, in turn, creates uncertainty over
whether relevant rulings of the Sanctions Committee continue
as good authority. 5 s
One of the principal reasons that the sponsors of the sanctions resolutions have tabled or agreed to such vague wording
is to enable them to garner the maximum support of other
members of the Council at the time of adoption of the sanctions resolutions. Frequently, disputes over technical terms are
deferred by last minute substitution of less precise language-often language used in an earlier resolution concerning
a different sanctions regime.'59 Even though such horse-trad157. Similar examples of vague drafting can be found in the U.S. Constitution,
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (e.g., "due process" reference in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments) and in important statutes (such as section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act of 1914 which empowers the FTC to prevent "unfair methods of competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1988)).
158. For example, it is unclear how the Committee's rulings on the provision of
port services to FRY vessels are effected by the adoption of Security Council Resolution 820, which requires states to impound FRY vessels.
159. See infra notes 161-87 and accompanying text (the Security Council Resolutions establishing the several sanctions regimes contain many similar or identical
provisions).
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ing over technical terms is not usually essential for passage of
the resolution, unanimous (or near unanimous) adoption by the
Council is seen as important in cases of binding Chapter VII
sanctions in order to signal wide-spread international support
for sanctions.
Another reason for such vagueness is that Security Council resolutions are drafted in a time-sensitive, rather than
deliberative, atmosphere. 60 In the context of hurried negotiations, the Council is simply unable to consider fully the range
of implications of its choice of language. Rather, the Security
Council usually has at best a general idea of what it wants to
accomplish through the adoption of a particular sanctions
resolution, but it is not always certain about what specific conduct to prohibit.
The Council, therefore, is content to adopt (or recycle)
vague terms in its sanctions resolutions and to defer to the
Sanctions Committee for evolving application and clarification
of the sanctions on a case-by-case basis. 6 ' Moreover, the
Council is usually not troubled by the potential for adverse
Sanctions Committee interpretations because each member of
the Council has an effective veto over any such interpretation.
By allowing the Sanctions Committee to assume the function
of interpreting the sanctions, the Council avoids the necessity
of facing the difficult task of minute specification of what is
and what is not to be permitted under the sanctions.
Surprisingly, with regard to some of the Sanctions
Committee's most important rulings, such as on the existence
of the "diplomatic," "safety," and "information materials" exceptions to the sanctions, the Security Council has taken no action
to codify through subsequent resolution the Sanctions
Committee's interpretations. On other questions, such as the
application of the sanctions to FRY vessels and the obligation
to freeze FRY assets, the Security Council has adopted the
Sanctions Committee interpretations in subsequent "clarifying"

160. Ironically, such time sensitivity is usually imposed by political factors
rather than any crisis situation on the ground.
161. In making case-by-case interpretations of the sanctions- resolutions, the
Sanctions Committee has not generally applied a "retroactivity doctrine," which,
under U.S. administrative law, provides that agency changes to standards of con-

duct cannot apply retroactively to persons who have acted in accordance with the
prevailing standards. See SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
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resolutions. However, the Security Council has demonstrated a
troubling tendency to overlook its previous clarifications when
instituting a new sanctions regime based on the provisions of
previous sanctions resolutions. For example, after the Security
Council clarified in resolution 670 that states were required by
resolution 661 to detain Iraqi ships and freeze Iraqi assets, the
Council repeated the unclear language of resolution 661 in
resolution 757 imposing sanctions on the FRY. The Council
subsequently adopted resolution 820, which made the same
clarifications that were made in resolution 670. To avoid unnecessary confusion, the Security Council should, to the extent
possible, codify the important rulings of the Sanctions Committee in subsequent resolutions, and new sanctions regimes
should take these clarifications fully into account.
The Sanctions Committee's March 16, 1992 ruling on the
dual-use helicopter case162 defined the Committee as a body
with a judicial function that was not explicitly delegated to it
by the Security Council but with regard to which the Council
has never objected. In this way, the Sanctions Committee fills
a gap existing in the methodology of interpreting Security
Council sanctions. Because the UN's traditional judicial
body-the International Court of Justice (ICJ)-is far too formal and cumbersome to provide speedy interpretation of the
sanctions resolutions in cases that number in the hundreds per
year, the Sanctions Committee acts as the only efficient forum
to resolve ambiguity uniformly in sanctions resolutions.163
While the Security Council has acquiesced in the expanding
judicial function of the Sanctions Committee, it has not taken
advantage of subsequent sanctions resolutions to explicitly
include this function in the Yugoslavia Sanctions Committee's
mandate, nor has it included this function in the mandate of
the subsequently established Haiti Sanctions Committee,1
162. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.

163. Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) requires the consent
of the parties and the Court's justice is generally slow and expensive. Since its
inception in 1945, the World Court has presided over less than 100 cases and its
docket has never surpassed a dozen cases in a year. See BARRY E. CARTER &

PmLLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 272 (1991).
164. See, e.g., France, the United States of America and Venezuela: draft resolution, U.N. SCOR, at 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/25957 (1993). Resolution 841 gives the Haiti

Sanctions Committee the following functions:
(a) to examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 below; (b)
to seek from all States further information regarding the action taken by
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suggesting that the status of the Sanctions Committee's judicial function is somewhat precarious. It would be unfortunate
if the Council were to reign-in the Committee's 'judicial function, given the vital role that the Sanctions Committee plays in
facilitating uniform interpretation of the sanctions. Consequently, the authors recommend that the mandate of future
Sanctions Committees explicitly grant those Committees the
authority "[t]o issue interpretations of the sanctions on a caseby-case basis in response to requests for fact-specific interpretations from governments."
B. Consistency Among Sanctions Regimes
As revealed by comparing the texts reproduced in the
notes below, the various UN sanctions regimes contain similar
or identical provisions concerning: an embargo on arms to the
sanctioned state (South Africa, 6 ' Libya, 6 6 the former
them concerning the effective implementation of this resolution; (c) to
consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning
violations of the measures imposed by this resolution and to recommend
appropriate measures in response thereto; (d) to consider and decide
expeditiously requests for the approval of imports of petroleum and petroleum products for essential humanitarian needs in accordance with paragraph 7 above; (e) to make periodic reports to the Security Council on
information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the present
resolution, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations; (f) to promulgate guidelines to facilitate implementation of this resolution.
165. See S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 2046th mtg. at 2, 1 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/418 (1977). The Security Council:
Decides that all States shall cease forthwith any provision to South Africa of arms and related material of all types, including the sale or transfer of weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and
shall cease as well the provision of all types of equipment and supplies
and grants of licensing arrangements for the manufacture or maintenance
of the aforementioned.
166. See S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 3063rd mtg. at 2, 1 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/748 (1992) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 748]. The Security Council:
Decides... that all States shall (a) prohibit any provision to Libya by
their nationals or from their territory of arms and related material of all
types, including the sale or transfer of weapons and ammunition, military
vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts
for the aforementioned, as well as the provision of any types of equipment, supplies and grants of licensing arrangements, for the manufacture
or maintenance of the aforementioned; (b) prohibit any provision to Libya
by their nationals or from their territory of technical advice, assistance or
training related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the
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and Haiti169 ); a prohibition of

air flights of the sanctioned state (Iraq,170 Libya, 71 and the

FRYlV2); the seizure of vessels and vehicles of the sanctioned

items in (a) above; (c) withdraw any of their officials or agents present in
Libya to advise the Libyan authorities on military matters.
167. See S.C. Res. 713, supra note 2, 9 6 ( "States shall . . . immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military
equipment to Yugoslavia.").
168. See S.C. Res. 733, U.N. SCOR, 3039th mtg. at 2, 9 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/733 (1992) ("States shall. . . immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia.").
169. See S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 3238th mtg. at 3, 9 5, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/841 (1993) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 841]. The Security Council:
Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of
petroleum or petroleum products or arms and related material of all
types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, police equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether
or not originating in their territories, to any person or body in Haiti or
to any person or body for the purpose of any business carried on in or
operated from Haiti, and any activities by their nationals or in their
territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply.
170. See S.C. Res. 670, supra note 115, at 25, 99 3, 4. The Security Council:
Decides that all States... shall deny permission to any aircraft to take
off from their territory if the aircraft would carry any cargo to or from
Iraq ...
other than food in humanitarian circumstances, subject to authorization by the Council or the [Sanctions Committee] and in accordance with resolution 666 (1990), or supplies intended strictly for medical
purposes or solely for UNIIMOG.
S.C. Res. 670, supra note 115, at 25, 99 3, 4. (Paragraph 4: "Decides further that
all States shall deny permission to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait, whatever its State of registration, to overfly its territory unless [it falls into
one of three exceptions].").
171. See S.C. Res. 748, supra note 166, at 2-3, 99 4, 6(b). The Security Council:
Decides that all States shall: (a) deny permission to any aircraft to take
off from, land in or overfly from the territory of Libya, unless the particular flight has been approved on grounds of significant humanitarian
need; (b) prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the supply of
any aircraft or aircraft components to Libya, the provision of engineering
and maintenance servicing of Libyan aircraft or aircraft components, the
certification of airworthiness for such aircraft, and the payment of new
claims against existing insurance contracts and the provision of new
direct insurance for such aircraft.
(The Resolution also states that the Security Council "Decides that all States
shall ...
prevent the operation of all Libyan Arab Airlines offices:").
172. See S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, 9 7. The Security Council:
Decides that all States shall: (a) deny permission to any aircraft to take
off from, land in or overfly their territory if it is destined to land in or
has taken off from the territory of the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro),
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state (Iraq173 and the FRY174 ); an embargo on imports
from the sanctioned state (Iraq175 and the FRY 76 ); an

unless the particular flight has been approved for humanitarian or other
purposes consistent with the relevant resolutions of the Council by the
Sanctions Committee; (b) prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the provision of engineering and maintenance servicing of aircraft
registered in the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) or operated by or on
behalf of entities in the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) or components for
such aircraft, the certification of airworthiness for such aircraft, and the
payment of new claims against existing insurance contracts and the provision of new direct insurance for such aircraft.
173. See S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, $ 7 (The Security Council "[calls upon
States to detain any ships of Iraqi registry which enter their ports and which are
being or have been used in violation of resolution 661 (1990), or to deny such
ships entrance to their ports except in circumstances recognized under international law as necessary to safeguard life.").
174. See S.C. Res. 820, supra note 97, at 6, 1 24. The Security Council:
Decides that all States shall impound all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling
stock and aircraft in their territories in which a majority or controlling
interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the FRY
and that these vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft may be
forfeit to the seizing State upon a determination that they have been in
violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present
resolution.
S.C. Res. 820, supra note 97, at 6, $ 24.
Paragraph 25: The Security Council:
Decides that all States shall detain pending investigation all vessels,
freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes found in their territories and suspected of having violated or being in violation of resolutions
713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992), or the present resolution, and that,
upon a determination that they have been in violation, such vessels,
freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft shall be impounded and, where
appropriate, they and their cargoes may be forfeit to the detaining State.
S.C. Res. 820, supra note 97, at 6,
25. Paragraph 26: The Security Council
"Confirms that States may charge the expense of impounding vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft to their owners."
175. See S.C. Res. 661, supra, note 115, $ 3. The Security Council:
Decides that all States shall prevent: (a) The import into their territories
of all commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait exported
therefrom after the date of the present resolution; (b) Any activities by
their nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or
products from Iraq and exported therefrom after the date of the present
resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Iraq for the
purposes of such activities or dealings.
176. See S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, 9 4. The Security Council:
Decides that all States shall prevent: (a) The import into" their territories
of all commodities and products originating in the FRY exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution; (b) Any activities by their
nationals or in their territories which would promote or are calculated to
promote the export or trans-shipment of any commodities or products
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embargo on exports to the sanctioned State (Iraq,17 7 the
FRY, 78 and Haiti 179); a prohibition on making available
originating in the FRY and . .. exported therefrom after the date of the
present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to the
FRY for the purposes of such activities or dealings.
177. See S.C. Res. 757 supra note 2, $ 4. See S.C. Res. 661 supra note 115;
S.C. Res. 670, supra note 115. Resolution 661, S 3 (c): The Security Council:
Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply by their nationals
or from their territories or using their flag vessels of any commodities or
products, including weapons or any other military equipment, whether or
not originating in their territories but not including supplies intended
strictly for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs, to any person or body in Iraq or Kuwait or to any person or body
for the purposes of any business carried on in or operated from Iraq or
Kuwait, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which
promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or products.
S.C. Res. 670, supra note 115, 1 2. Resolution 670, Paragraph 2: The Security
Council "[clonfirms that resolution 661 (1990) applies to all means of transport,
including aircraft." S.C. Res. 687, supra note 43, T 20. The Security Council:
Decides, effectively immediately, that the prohibitions against the sale or
supply to Iraq of commodities or products, other than medicine and
health supplies, and prohibitions against financial transactions related
thereto contained in resolution 660 (1990) shall not apply to foodstuffs
notified to the [Sanctions Committee] or with the approval of that Committee, under the simplified and accelerated "no-objection' procedure, to
materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the
report of the Secretary General dated 20 March 1991, and in any further
findings of humanitarian need by the Committee.
178. See S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, at 3, 4, 1 4(c). The Security Council:
Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply by their nationals
or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft of any
commodities or products, whether or not originating in their territories,
but not including supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and
foodstuffs notified to the [Sanctions Committee], to any person or body
for the purpose of any business carried on in or operated from the FRY,
and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote
or are calculated to promote such sale or supply of such commodities or
products.
See S.C. Res. 760, supra note 2. The Security Council:
Decides that the prohibitions in paragraph 4(c) of resolution 757 (1992)
concerning the sale or supply to the FRY of commodities or products,
other than medical supplies and foodstuffs, and the prohibitions against
financial transactions related thereto, contained in Resolution 757 (1992)
shall not apply, with the approval of the [Sanctions Committee] under
the simplified and accelerated "no objection' procedure, to commodities
and products for essential humanitarian need.
179. See S.C. Res. 841, supra note 169, at 3, 1 5. The Security Council:
Decides that all States shall prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of
petroleum or petroleum products or arms and related material of all
types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equip-
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funds or other resources to the sanctioned state (Iraq' 80 and
the FRY 81 ); the freezing of assets of the sanctioned state
(Iraq, 182 the FRY,'183

and Haiti's4); and the reduction of

ment, police equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether
or not originating in their territories, to any person or body in Haiti or
to any person or body for the purpose of any business carried on in or
operated from Haiti, and any activities by their nationals or in their
territories which promote or are calculated to promote such sale or supply.
180. See S.C. Res. 661, supra note 115, at 20, 4. The Security Council:
Decides that all States shall not make available to the Government of
Iraq or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in Iraq
or Kuwait, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and
shall prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories
from removing from their territories or otherwise making available to
that Government or to any such undertaking any such funds or resources
and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within Iraq or
Kuwait, except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian
purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.
181. See S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, at 4, T 5. The Security Council:
Decides that all States shall not make available to the authorities in the
FRY or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in the
FRY, any funds or any other financial or economic resources and shall
prevent their nationals and any persons within their territories from
removing from their territories or otherwise making available to those
authorities or to any such undertaking of any such funds or resources
and from remitting any other funds to persons or bodies within the FRY,
except payments exclusively for strictly medical or humanitarian purposes
and foodstuffs.
182. See S.C. Res. 670, supra note 115, at 25, T 9. (The Security Council "[reminds all States of their obligations under resolution 661 (1990) with regard to
the freezing of Iraqi assets, and the protection of the assets of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its agencies, located within their territory and to report to
the [Sanctions Committee] regarding those assets.").
183. See S.C. Res. 820, supra note 97, at 5, 9 21. The Security Council:
Decides that States in which there are funds, including any funds derived
from property, (a) of the authorities in the FRY, or (b) of commercial,
industrial or public utility undertakings in the FRY, or (c) controlled
directly or indirectly by such authorities or undertakings or by entities,
wherever located or organized, owned or controlled by such authorities or
undertakings, shall require all persons and entities within their own
territories holding such funds to freeze them to ensure that they are not
made available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the authorities in the FRY or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in the FRY, and calls on all States to report to the [Sanctions
Committee] on actions taken pursuant to this paragraph.
184. See S.C. Res. 841, supra note 169, at 3, 9 8. The Security Council:
Decides that States in which there are funds, including any funds derived
from property, (a) of the Government of Haiti or of the de facto authorities in Haiti, or (b) controlled directly or indirectly by such Government
authorities or by entities, wherever located or organized, owned or con-
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diplomatic ties with the sanctioned state (Libya. 5 and the
FRY 86).

For reasons of fairness and predictability, identical provisions in different regimes should be construed as identical in
scope. 81 It logically follows that questions arising under one
sanctions regime should not be addressed solely in terms of the
precedent of that regime. Rather, recourse should be made to
the precedent of the other regimes and each case should be
viewed as a potential precedent for such other regimes including as yet unforeseen regimes that may be instituted in the
future, using the provisions of the current Security Council
resolutions as models. There is no mechanism, however, to ensure this consistency under the existing system.
Rather than create a single UN Sanctions Committee,
separate Sanctions Committees have been established for each
of the sanctions regimes. Although -the several Sanctions Committees are composed of the same states (i.e., the members of
the Security Council), frequently these states assign different
personnel at their UN missions and at their capitals to participate in the proceedings of the different Committees and to
make decisions regarding the different regimes. There is an
obvious need for a coordinating mechanism between regimes.
At a minimum, the UN Secretariat should publish a bi-annual
"Sanctions Committee Digest," similar to Part I of this article,
which would index and summarize the rulings of the several
Sanctions Committees for easy reference.

trolled by such Government or authorities, shall require all persons and
entities within their own territories holding such funds to freeze them to
ensure that they are not made available directly or indirectly to or for
the benefit of the de facto authorities in Haiti.
185. See S.C. Res. 748, supra note 166, at 3, T 6. The Security Council:
Decides that all States shall . . . significantly reduce the number and the
level of the staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and consular posts and
restrict or control the movement within their territory of all such staff
who remain; in the case of Libyan missions to international organizations, the host state may, as it deems necessary, consult the organization
concerned on the measures required to implement this subparagraph.
186. See S.C. Res. 757, supra note 2, at 4, 8. (The Security Council "Decides
that all States shall reduce the level of the staff at diplomatic missions and consular posts of the FRY.").
187. While the practice of interpreting the several sanctions regimes differently
has the advantage of allowing the UN to be tougher on one sanctioned country
than another depending on the prevailing circumstances, such disparate treatment
would be better accomplished by varying the language of the sanctions resolutions.
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C. The Nature of the Sanctions Committee
Although it serves a judicial function, in many ways the
Sanctions Committee differs from traditional judicial bodies or
administrative agencies. 8 These differences are discussed
below, under the following categories: (1) composition and
operation of the Bench; (2) form of decision; and, (3) decisionmaking process.
1. Composition and Operation of the Bench
Although the Sanctions Committee performs a judicial
role, its composition and operation are unlike any other judicial entity. The Sanctions Committee, for example, is composed
of diplomats rather than experienced lawyers or jurists. Because of their background, the Committee's members are accustomed to a problem-solving technique that stresses negotiation rather than legal reasoning. Moreover, unlike a traditional
judicial body or administrative agency, the Sanctions Committee does not consist of a known bench. The composition of the
Committee is in constant flux, changing as diplomats move on
to other assignments and as "substitutes" sit in for their colleagues on a frequent basis, thereby disrupting the continuity
of the bench. 8 9 Finally, unlike a tribunal in which decisions
are made by majority vote, in a consensus-based system, such
as that employed by the Sanctions Committee, one Committee
member (and hence state) can dominate the whole group. This
also encourages horse-trading rather than principled decisionmaking. These factors greatly reduce the jural quality of the
Committee's decisions. To remedy this defect the Sanctions
Committee should make its decisions by vote, rather than
consensus, and the members of the Committee should be persons of recognized competence in international law appointed

188. While the authors' recommendations seek to enhance the jural quality of
the Sanctions Committee decision-making, other commentators have argued generally that questions of interpretation and dispute resolution in the context of international organizations are better resolved by political rather than judicial processes. See H.G. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1193, 1203-06
(1980).
189. According to one of the U.S. officials who attend Sanctions Committee
meetings, "you end up with different decisions depending on [who] is in the chair
for the United States, and similarly for most others states." Interview with
Frederick Baron, supra note 5.
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by the members of the Security Council to serve fixed-year
terms. 90
Perhaps the most significant distinction between the Sanctions Committee and most international tribunals and domestic courts in the common law tradition is that the Sanctions
Committee does not employ adversary argument by Counsel to
narrow and sharpen the decision process. Argument of Counsel
can increase predictability by locating and pointing to significant issues, by gathering and focusing crucial authorities, by
making facts clear and vivid, and by illuminating the probable
consequences of potential decisions."' 1 Nor does the Sanctions Committee follow the informal rule-making procedure
employed by United States administrative agencies, which provides for notice of a proposed rule and submission of views or
arguments by interested parties.192 The efficacy of the Committee would be improved greatly if in important (as opposed
to clearly routine) cases it were to entertain limited oral presentation by the state requesting an interpretation and brief
written submissions by other states with a direct interest in
the case.
2. Form of Decision
The form of the Sanctions Committee's decision also distinguishes it from other judicial entities. For example, the Sanctions Committee neither issues signed opinions nor records the
vote of its members as do most judicial bodies. Anonymous
decisions behind closed doors give rise to complaints that the
Committee is acting like a "Star Chamber," whose members
are insulated from even the barest measure of accountability
for their rulings. 9 ' Moreover, the Sanctions Committee does

190. Cf STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, arts. 2-18, reprinted in FRANCIS 0. WILCOX & CARL M. MARCY, PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE
UNITED NATIONS 500 (1955) [hereinafter ARTICLES]. (Judges of the ICJ are elected
for nine-year terms and are required to have the qualifications required in their
respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial office or be
jurisconsults of recognized competence in international law.).
191. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
(1960), reprinted in GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 989 (1973).

192. See R. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 321 (1985).
193. Cf Joint Antifacist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("a democratic government must therefore practice fairness, and fairness can rarely be obtained by secret one-sided determina-
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not issue a detailed opinion in the way a traditional court or
administrative agency would-setting forth its findings of fact
and application of law to those particular facts. Instead, the
Committee issues brief conclusory communications, with the
barest references to context.
In the common law tradition, in order to ascertain from a
case the guiding (or binding) legal principle, one must identify
the case's "ratio decidendi," which has been defined as "the
material facts of the case plus the decision thereon."'94 The
Sanctions Committee frequently does not specify these material facts. One must read the Committee's rulings together
with the incoming communications and the record of proceedings to even begin to ascertain what facts may have been considered material. Often it is simply impossible to determine
from this record which of the various facts the Committee
determined to be material or immaterial. Moreover, the Sanctions Committee rarely enunciates its legal reasoning in its
communications. There is, therefore, no guide 'for determining
which facts played a significant role in the Committee's decision.
Technically, the principle of stare decisis does not apply to
the International Court of Justice and other international
tribunals.'95 Nevertheless, such international judicial bodies
"are respectful of precedent" 9 ' and frequently cite their previous decisions for authority and distinguish decisions When
they are not being followed in similar cases. 9 v Although the
record of the Sanctions Committee's deliberations are full of
tions of facts decisive of rights").
194. A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. REV. 413
(1958).
195. See ARTICLES, supra note 190, at 507. (Article 59 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice states that "[t]he decision of the court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.").
196. See LouIs HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (1980).
197. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT 612 (1965). See also HENKIN, ET AL., supra note 196, at 89. According to

Professors Henkin et al., "the reluctance [of international courts] to depart openly
from a previous judgment or opinion given by the same court, or by another international judicial authority of high standing, is hardly less pronounced than in
municipal jurisdictions." HENKIN ET AL., supra note 196, at 89. But see T.
HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 49-50 (1988) (noting
that the Court of Justice of the European Communities rarely refers to its previous decisions and has on occasion failed to follow its precedent without attempt to
distinguish it).
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references to previous cases which the Committee Members
considered to constitute precedent, Sanctions Committee formal communications rarely cite to the Committee's past precedent. Several of the Committee's communications, moreover,
explicitly assert that they are not to be taken as precedent for
future cases 98 and the Committee has on occasion simply reversed itself without attempting to distinguish the previous
decision or explain its change of course.'99
The absence of the doctrine of precedent leads inevitably
to incoherent and unpredictable rulings. "Consistency is a
prime value in a legal system" and justice requires that like
cases be treated alike.0 Foreseeability as to what conduct is
permissible or impermissible is especially critical in the area of
sanctions implementation because of the many business relationships that are affected.2 ' In addition, if it is to function
as a judicial body, the Committee has a duty to introduce into
its work some degree of reason and some sense of fairness. By
announcing that a particular decision shall not constitute precedent, the Committee undermines the international
community's respect for and confidence in its decisions. Moreover, by adopting a politically expedient decision that does not
fit into its precedent, the Committee impairs the rule of law. In
contrast, one past president of the International Court of Justice lauded the ICJ's "remarkable unity of precedent [as] an
important factor in the development of international law." 2
At least with respect to important (as opposed to routine) cas-

198. See, e.g., Letter from the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee to the

Permanent Mission of Romania (Dec. 24, 1992) (U.N. Doc. S/AC.27/199/0C.2106)
With respect to its ruling authorizing the return of FRY vessels being detained by
Romania, the Committee stated: "the present exception does not set a precedent
for any future course of action in similar circumstances." Id. With respect to its
ruling authorizing the unloading of cargo from a detained FRY vessel, the Committee stated: "It should be clearly understood that the Committee's decision ...
in no way constitutes a precedent for any comparable situation which may arise in
[the] future." Id.
199. See supra notes 124-25 and 130-31 and accompanying text.
200. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLiM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATwE LAW
307 (1993).
201. The authors recognize, on the other hand, that heightened foreseeability
may render it more difficult for the members of the Security Council to agree on

the terms to be included in sanctions resolutions since it eliminates the possibility
of creative ambiguity.
202. See The Court and the Registry, 1961-1962 Y.B. INTL CT. JUST. 1, 2.
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es, the Committee should issue brief written opinions that
identify the material facts and application of law to those facts.
3. Decision Making Process
The Sanctions Committee does not have much recourse to
one of the fundamental tools of legal interpretation: a detailed
negotiating record. °3 One would expect the function of the
Sanctions Committee, as a quasi-judicial body, to be to interpret the provisions of the sanctions resolutions in the light of
the purposes which the Security Council had in mind in adopting them. However, the members of the Security Council rarely
use their "Explanations of Vote" (or, in UN parlance, EOVs) to
give interpretive statements on specific provisions of resolutions. Instead, for the most part, EOVs are largely political
statements, intended to send diplomatic signals rather than to
clarify legal meaning. The debate on resolution 821, creating
the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, was a notable exception.0 4 Many of the members of the Council explicitly provided detailed interpretive statements on the provisions of the
Statute for the War Crimes Tribunal. It would be of great
utility to the operation of the Sanctions Committee if the members of the Security Council continued to provide such interpretive statements, particularly with respect to the meaning of
the provisions of sanctions resolutions.
III. CONCLUSION
Although not originally intended for that purpose, the
United Nations Sanctions Committees have come to play a
vital role in issuing authoritative interpretations of UN sanctions resolutions. The analysis of the Yugoslavia Sanctions
Committee's key decisions provided in this Article indicates
that the Committee has issued a number of novel and surprising interpretations that at times greatly expand, and at others
contract, the meaning of sanctions resolutions. Until now, the
Committee has operated in obscurity, with its rulings and

203. Cf Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (entered into force 1980) (recourse should be had to
the negotiating record to determine the meaning of an instrument when its terms

leave the meaning ambiguous or obscure).
204. See U.N. SCOR, 3270th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/PV. 3217 (1993).
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record familiar only to a handful of government officials, despite the fact that the interpretations of the Committee have a
direct impact on the conduct of thousands of businesses around
the world on a daily basis.
One principal purpose of this Article has been to demonstrate the need for the UN to publish a bi-annual digest of the
rulings of its Sanctions Committees, which, like Part I of this
Article, would analyze the Committees' cases in their context
and group the decisions by topic for ease of reference. Such a
digest would prove instrumental to governments and businesses, as well as to the Sanctions Committee itself. Throughout
the Article, the authors have made several other recommendations to improve the operation of the Sanctions Committee and
the interpretation of Security Council resolutions, which are
summarized below:
(1) The Security Council should in future resolutions provide expressly that the Sanctions Committee's mandate
include issuing interpretations of the sanctions resolutions,
so that there can be no question of the Committee's continuing competence to undertake this function;
(2) The Security Council should take several steps to enhance the jural quality of the Sanctions Committee, including: (a) creating a single comprehensive Sanctions
Committee to handle all of the UN sanctions regimes; (b)
requiring that the members of the Sanctions Committee be
experts with legal experience appointed by the members of
the Security Council to serve fixed-year terms; (c) requiring that the Sanctions Committee make its decisions by
vote, rather than consensus, and in important cases, that
the Committee issue signed, written, opinions that identify
the material facts and application of law to those facts;
and (d) authorizing the Committee in important cases to
allow limited oral presentation by the state requesting an
interpretation and brief written submissions of interest by
other states;
(3) In their Explanation of Votes, the Members of the Security Council should provide interpretive statements with
respect to the meaning of the provisions of sanctions resolutions to aid the Sanctions Committee in interpreting the
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resolutions in the light of the purposes which the Security
Council had in mind in adopting them; and
(4) The Security Council should, to the extent possible,
codify the important rulings of the Sanctions Committee in
subsequent resolutions, and should fully reflect these clarifications in new sanctions regimes.
In making these recommendations, the authors are sensitive to the view expressed by the United States Supreme Court
in a similar context that "conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources" should be taken into account in determining
how judicial a decision-making process should be.2 °5 The authors also recognize that some of these suggestions are likely
to encounter initial political resistance. However, as the Security Council continues to intensify its reliance on comprehensive economic sanctions to respond to threats to international
peace and security around the globe, the several UN Sanctions
Committees will play an increasingly important role in interpreting those sanctions. Consequently, their work will come
under heightened public scrutiny and there is likely to be increasing pressure to clarify the Sanctions Committees' authority to issue interpretations of the Sanctions resolutions, to legitimate the process by which such interpretations are rendered,
and to make these interpretations readily available to the
public.

205. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976).

